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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2A3(2)(j) (1996). As the final judgment of the Eighth Judicial District Court, this appeal is taken
as of right pursuant to Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the Court err in holding that Syscom was not a contractor under the Utah

Construction Trades Licensing Act, and was therefore not barred from suing for materials and
services?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This legal determination is reviewed for correctness. Jones.
Waldo, et al. v. Dawson. 298 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 11 (Utah 1996). (Issue preserved for review
at R. 959.)
2.

Did the Court err in refusing to find that Syscom had breached various material

duties and obligations under the Management Agreement, and was therefore not entitled to
recover?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This legal determination is reviewed for correctness. Jones.
Waldo, et al. v. Dawson. 298 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 11 (Utah 1996). (Issue preserved for review
at R. 959.)
3.

Did the Court err in finding that Cellcom had breached the Management Agreement

by failing to communicate with Syscom?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This finding of fact is reviewed under the clearly erroneous
standard. Cal Wadsworth Constr. v. Citv of St. George. 898 P.2d 1372, 1378 (Utah 1995).
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4.

Did the Court err in refusing to reopen to consider additional evidence, or to order

a new trial on the basis of its own legal error, or, as an additional ground, the discovery of
additional evidence showing Sy scorn's breach caused Cellcom to suffer millions of dollars in
damages?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: These decisions are reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Issue
preserved for review at R. 1040, 1097.)
5.

Did the Court err in refusing to recuse when his former firm's representation of

Syscom in a transaction related to this lawsuit created the appearance of impartiality?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This legal determination is reviewed for correctness. Jones.
Waldo, et al. v. Dawson. 298 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 10 (Utah 1996). (Issue preserved for review
atR. 1051.)
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Construction Trades Licensing Act, § 58-55-101, et seq. (1995).
Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-1(1) (1953, as amended).
Utah Code of Judicial Conduct, Canons 2 and 3.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a contract action arising from the construction of a cellular telephone system in
eastern Utah. In 1989, American Rural Cellular ("Cellcom" or "ARC") had earned Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC") permits to build cellular systems in eastern Utah (Utah-5),
and in central Pennsylvania (PA-11). Cellcom hired Syscom to construct one Mobile Telephone
Switching Office (MTSO), and two cell sites, each with a building, towers, access road, fencing
and large antennae in eastern Utah. As the first phase of construction neared completion, Syscom
-2-

had expended all of the funds budgeted to construct the three sites and run the system for the
ensuing nine months.
Cellcom asked Syscom to account for the monies spent, so that Cellcom could avoid
default by accounting to its lender, Motorola. Syscom responded by filing three mechanic's liens
claiming $89,000, plus attorney's fees. Cellcom filed this action for breach of contract, to
terminate the contract, and to void the mechanic's liens. Syscom counterclaimed for more money
it claimed was owing.
After a bench trial in October, 1992 the court held that: (1) Syscom had breached the
contract but the breach was de minimis; (2) Cellcom was justified in terminating the contract but
that no damages resulted to Cellcom; and (3) entered judgment on the Counterclaim, awarding
Syscom its attorney's fees and a judgment for $116,040.96. Cellcom appealed.
The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded on the issue of whether Syscom was entitled
to recover. American Rural Cellular Inc. v. Systems Communications Corp.. et al.. 890 P.2d
1035 (Utah App. 1995) (Cellcom I). Holding that the Court's Findings of Fact were woefully
deficient and that its Conclusions of Law were in error, it reversed and remanded with detailed
instructions.
Upon remand, the Court entered judgment on September 18, 1995, again holding that
Syscom was not a contractor under the Utah Construction Trades Licensing Act and was entitled
to recover from Cellcom. The Court added to the judgment amounts not awarded in the first
judgment, added interest and increased the award of attorney's fees to Syscom.
Cellcom then learned that before Judge Anderson took the bench his two-person law firm
had represented Syscom and its president, Rodney Hauer, in a stock purchase transaction related

to this lawsuit. Cellcom moved the Court to recuse itself. Cellcom also moved to reopen the case
for the submission of additional evidence under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 59, and in the
alternative, moved for a new trial, on the basis of legal error and the discovery of new evidence
of the numerous deficiencies in the work Sy scorn had performed, and the millions of dollars of
consequential damages caused by Sy scorn's failure to account for the money it had expended.
Syscom's breach lead to Cellcom's lender foreclosing on the PA-11 permit, property and assets.
The Court denied all Cellcom's motions, including the Motion to Recuse. This appealed
followed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

In 1989, American Rural Cellular, Inc. (Cellcom) was awarded FCC construction

permits to construct cellular systems in eastern Utah (Utah-5), and in central Pennsylvania (PA11). (R. 531,754.)
2.

Cellcom was formed in the mid-1980's in order to pursue cellular telephone

construction permits from the FCC. (R. 1368; Dennis O'Neill Aff., ^ 3, attached to plaintiff's
Memorandum of Law Supporting its Rule 59 Motions and therein offered; rejected by Court's
Ruling, November 9, 1995; R. 1307.) To qualify for the construction permits Cellcom spent
approximately $125,000 (of which $84,600 was for FCC filing fees) to demonstrate to the FCC
that it was capable of constructing and operating a cellular telephone system. QcL at *[ 4.) Only
after many months of endeavor to meet FCC standards did Cellcom qualify for the permit lottery.
(IcLatl5.)
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3.

After obtaining a Utah Construction permit from the FCC, Cellcom approached

Systems Communications, Inc. (Syscom) and negotiated a contract wherein Syscom would build
and then help manage the Utah-5 system. (Ex.1, R. 532.)
4.

Mr. Sorensen, President of Syscom, testified that "we were a telephone and radio

company as well as we did a lot of other forms of technical, wireless communications. We built
supervisory control and data acquisition. We built sites for ourselves and for others. We installed
antennas, transmission lines, we did microwave radio communications point-to-point." (R. 552.)
5.

No one at Syscom had any experience operating a cellular system. Mr. Sorensen

was trained at Cellcom's expense to manage and maintain the technical aspects of the system.
(R. 771.)
6.

Syscom was not a partner of or a joint venturer with Cellcom. (R. 727.)

7.

No officer, director or employee of Cellcom had any experience in the construction

trades or construction business. (R. 546-47.)
8.

Before contracting with Syscom, Cellcom negotiated with several equipment

vendors, including Motorola, that offered to lend construction, equipment and operating funds to
Cellcom; Cellcom chose Motorola. (R. 544.)
9.

Cellcom's projects in Utah-5 and PA-11 were financed by Motorola, Inc. Before

gaining financing, Cellcom had to submit, among other things, a detailed business plan to
Motorola, including construction and operation costs. (R. 546-547.)
10.

Cellcom asked Syscom to submit a complete and detailed bid for what it would cost

to construct two cell sites and one MTSO. (R. 544, 545.) Cellcom told Syscom to be as specific
as possible with its bid. (R. 618.) Syscom understood that Cellcom would rely on Syscom's bid

when it submitted its business plan to Motorola. (R. 545, 546, 760.) Syscom submitted a detailed
bid to Cellcom, stating that it would construct the three sites for $205,477. (R. 545; Ex. 5.)
Syscom agreed to build the three sites for the bid amount. (R. 618, 620.) Cellcom relied on and
submitted Syscom's bid to Motorola as part of Cellcom's business plan. (R. 544, 546, 618.)
Cellcom received the funding from Motorola, and believed the financing, based on Syscom's bid,
would be sufficient to construct the system and fund operations for one year. (R. 546, 566.)
11.

Cellcom and Syscom reduced their contract to a written Management Agreement,

which was Trial Exhibit 1 and Trial Exhibit 75, a copy of which is the first document in the
Addendum to this Brief. It provided, inter alia, that Cellcom was an independent contractor with
certain enumerated performance obligations.
12.

Syscom's compensation was specified in the Management Agreement. (Trial Exs.

1 & 75; Addendum hereto.)
13.

The Management Agreement provided that: "Syscom shall, at its own expense,

provide a telephone line with a unique telephone number listed in the local telephone listings as
the telephone number of the Cellular Business." (li., p. 10) (emphasis added).
14.

The Management Agreement stated how Cellcom could terminate the Management

Agreement. (14. at *[ 10.)
15.

Cellcom contracted with Syscom to build the sites because Syscom convinced

Cellcom that it could construct the sites within budget. Marie Bagshaw of Cellcom testified that:
[tjhey had actually - they built their own buildings. They showed us buildings that
they had built to put up at the cell sites. They had erected towers. They had crews
to do that . . . They had a building in their back room or their work area, their
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garage area, that they showed us that they had constructed (Ex. 4 ) . . . . One they
had constructed and was going to be using for another site. One of their radio
sites, two way or a microwave. This is a building that is the same type of building
that would use for cellular to install your equipment. . . They represented to us
that they could build that building. (R. 540-541; Ex. 4.)
16.

Ms. Bagshaw testified that Neal Sorensen, Syscom's President,

had represented to us that - you know - his people were qualified to help build the
system and to help construct the buildings and whatever needed to be done, [and
that] that was always the understanding that we had that their crew would be used
as needed to construct the system." (R. 540.)
17.

Mr. Sorensen told Cellcom that he had personally constructed buildings and towers

suitable for Cellcom's purposes, in order to convince Cellcom to enter into the Management
Agreement. (R.541, 543, 757, 800.) Mr. Sorensen testified that "in 1989 Cellcom reviewed
companies locally to help them construct the business. Evidently we satisfied them that we could
perform the services that they required." (R. 753.) Mr. Sorensen testified that in the Fall of 1989
"I convinced them that I could do this for them. I sold Syscom services to them." (R.757.)
Cellcom relied on Syscom's competence inferred from its representations that it was a contractor
that could build the sites. (R. 541, 543, 757.)
18.

Syscom subsequently hired subcontractors and materialmen to build the three sites,

including Dennis Martinsen, Jackson Insulation and Construction, Earl's Fencing, D&D Electric,
Larry Allred, Swain's, Freestone Construction, Web Crane and others. (R. 703, 708-711.)
19.

The system had to be minimally operational by October 5, 1990, and it was.

(R. 626.)
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20.

Syscom directly paid the persons and materialmen who worked on the sites.

Syscom never asked for authorization to make any construction-related expenditure or to pay
anyone. Syscom alone decided how to spend the construction money. (R. 570, 657.)
21.

No officer or employee of Syscom had ever been a licensed contractor or licensed

electrician, either before or during the construction. (R. 723 -724.)
22.

Syscom listed itself as the owner of and general contractor for the Asphalt Ridge

cell site on the building permit application for that site. (R. 724 -726; Ex. 56.) On the same
application, Syscom listed itself as the electrical contractor for the Asphalt Ridge cell site. Id.
Again, on the Blue Bench cell site building permit application, Syscom listed itself as the owner
of and general contractor and electrical contractor for the site. (R. 727, Ex. 57.)
23.

Syscom was paid the $10,000 a month to, among other things, have Mr. Sorensen

manage construction, which funds were withdrawn from the construction account, with respect
to which "you could only do a draw down after you had completed a phase of the construction."
(R. 547-548.)
24.

It was the parties' understanding that the $10,000 monthly fee was for Syscom and

its employees to construct, operate and maintain the system. (R. 578-582, 631, 632, Ex. 1.)
25.

Mr. Sorensen managed the construction of buildings and towers. He was "out

there working with the crews," and was the "responsible [person] from Syscom to see that the
cellular system was constructed." (T. 578-582.)
26.

Long before construction began, an East Coast engineering firm conducted radio

frequency studies to determine the best locations for the cell sites and MTSO. (R. 532, 559.)
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There is no evidence that Syscom was supervised by a licensed general contractor, licensed
engineer, architect, Cellcom, or anyone, when it built the sites.
27.

Before beginning construction, Mr. Sorensen determined ownership of the land

where the engineers had determined the site should be located. He also employed a local
engineering firm to plan how to get power lines to the sites. (R. 763.)
28.

Motorola lent Cellcom enough money to construct the first phase of the system and

operate it for a year after conipletion of the first phase. (Ex. 14, R. 566, 654.) It would take five
years to complete the entire system that would cover Duchesne, Uintah, Daggett, Carbon, Emery
and Grand counties. (R. 567, 772)
29.

A total of $488,258.93 was available to Syscom. Of this, $30,000 was wired to

Cellcom's FCC attorney in Washington, D.C., $81,740 was wired to Cellcom officers for salaries
and expenses (R. 558), leaving $376,518.93 to construct the first phase of the system and to
operate it for one year. (Ex 14, R. 668.)
30.

Syscom helped Motorola install switches and cell site equipment (R. 769); Syscom

arranged for an outside billing company to manage the subscriber billings. (R. 770.)
31.

A condition of Cellcom's financing agreement with Motorola required Cellcom to

submit quarterly accountings to Motorola detailing how each dollar borrowed from Motorola had
been used. (R. 564.) In turn, a condition of Syscom's contract with Cellcom required Syscom
to prepare detailed financial reports about the construction and operation of the system. (R. 537538, 813, Ex. l,pp. 3-4.)
32.

Syscom had Cellcom's funds at its disposal. Syscom was supposed to set up a

construction account and a capital account in Cellcom's name, but never did; instead it established
-9-

accounts in Syscom's name only. (R. 537, 564.) Syscom received monthly checking account
statements, yet Syscom never forwarded any monthly statements to Cellcom. (R. 564-566.)
33.

The first quarterly accounting was due in October 1990, the second in January

1991. (R. 637, 655.)
34.

On several occasions, as to the accounting Syscom was supposed to do, Cellcom

asked Syscom to submit invoices and bank records so it could account to Motorola as to how the
funds had been spent. (R. 568, 570.) Syscom failed and refused to keep Cellcom appraised of
how the funds were expended as the system was built. (R. 538-539.)
35.

In late November 1990, Syscom informed Cellcom that it was nearly out of money.

(R. 569.) This notification was the first that Cellcom knew that funds were getting low. (R. 569,
657.)
36.

In late November or early December 1990, Ms. Bagshaw telephoned Mr. Sorensen

at least twice and informed him that the receipts he had supplied were incomplete, and that
without complete information she could not account to Motorola. (R. 607.) Mr. Sorensen
promised to comply. (R. 607.) He sent some information, but never enough to account for the
monies spent. (R. 637-638.)
37.

Mr. Sorensen knew Syscom had a contractual obligation to provide detailed

financial reports to Cellcom. (R. 813.) He admitted that the financial information he submitted
to Cellcom was incomplete and inadequate. (R. 814.) Syscom's bookkeeper was never instructed
to send any invoices or receipts to Cellcom. (R. 836-837.)
38.

In November 1990, and again in February 1991, Cellcom attempted to account to

Motorola for the funds and submitted what information it had, but Motorola rejected it.
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(R. 568, 655.) Motorola refused to provide any more funding to Cellcom unless and until it
properly accounted for the funds. (R.567-568.) Mr. Sorensen knew that Motorola could not
understand and was dissatisfied with the financial documents that Syscorn had submitted. (R. 812813.)
39.

In mid-January, Mr. Dennis O'Neill, President of Cellcom, instructed

Ms. Bagshaw not to telephone Mr. Sorensen. (R.605.) She was not instructed to not return
Mr. Sorensen's calls or write to him. (R. 605.) In January 1991, Ms. Bagshaw traveled from
her Florida office to visit Sy scorn in Vernal. She asked to see invoices, bank statements, and
other documents so Cellcom could do the accounting that Sy scorn was supposed to have done.
Mr. Sorensen told her he did not have the information, that he had mailed it to her at Cellcom's
Florida address. She did not receive anything from Syscom through the mail until mid-February,
and only after additional written and oral demands. (R. 616-617.)
40.

On February 7, 1991, Ms. Bagshaw sent a certified letter to iNeai sorensen, again

asking for a complete accounting and for all underlying documents. (Ex. 18, R. 570.) On
February 11, 1991, Syscom acknowledged receipt of the letter and wrote back agreeing to submit
the information, admitting that Cellcom "ha[d] every right to this information." (Ex. 19, R. 571.)
41.

On March 1, 1991, Ms. Bagshaw telephoned Mr. Sorensen to discuss a variety of

topics. She informed him that Cellcom was not happy with Syscom's performance. (R. 606.)
42.

On March 8, 1991, Syscom filed three mechanic's liens on the property it had

improved. (Ex. 49, 50, 51.) Once the liens were filed, Motorola threatened to declare the
financing agreement with Cellcom in default unless Cellcom took the system over from Syscom.
(R. 573.)
.11.

43.

On March 20, 1991, Cellcom, exercising its rights under the Management

Agreement, took the system over and relieved Syscom of its duties based on at least three
grounds: (1) Syscom failed to follow Cellcom's directives; (2) Syscom spent excessive amounts
of money; and (3) Syscom sold a competing product. (R. 568, 572, 578; Ex. 22.)
44.

The financial records turned over by Syscom after the March 20, 1991, takeover

were incomplete, and Cellcom could not determine what had been purchased by Syscom and
where the money had been spent. (R. 579.)
45.

Syscom never properly accounted for how it spent the money at any time between

July 1990 (when construction began) and March 1991, or at any time thereafter. (R. 638, 817.)
46.

The first phase of the system construction was more or less substantially completed

sometime in January 1991. (R. 807.) However, additional monies had to be spent on equipment
to complete the system after Cellcom ended the contract. This equipment should have been
installed by Syscom as part of constructing the system. (R. 662.)
47.

During the time Syscom operated the system for Cellcom, it solicited all of

Cellcom's customers by including a brochure with Cellcom's billing statement for its subscribers
that advertised a non-cellular two-way radio sold by Syscom, in direct violation of the Sales Agent
Agreement and the Management Agreement. (R. 574-575; 649; 727-734, 740; Ex. 61.) Syscom
agreed that the ad encouraged customers to not use cellular phones. (R. 728.)
48.

Mr. Sorensen claimed that goods and services reflected in the invoices were actually

received by Cellcom. (R. 799.)
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49.

Bills from suppliers and others arising from building and operating the system were

paid by Syscom with Cellcom's money. The bills were not paid for with Syscom's money.
(R. 821.)
50.

When Cellcom took over the system on March 20, 1991, the system was operating,

but numerous problems were later discovered. The electrical wiring at the Blue Bench, Asphalt
Ridge and MTSO sites was done in violation of the National Electric Code. (R. 603.) The billing
system did not work, as the master codes had been removed, requiring at least a week's time to
reprogram. (Ex. 48, R. 601.) Mr. Sorensen claims that the billing system was working when
Syscom turned the system back to Cellcom. (R. 795.) Three expensive antennas purchased by
Syscom with Cellcom's money were not given back to Cellcom. (R. 603-604.)
51.

Syscom was obligated under the Management Agreement to set up roaming

agreements with other cellular and land line telephone companies. No roaming agreements were
set up by Syscom. (R. 643; Ex. 1, 75.)
52.

The Management Agreement provided that Syscom would build and then operate

the system for five years in exchange for $10,000 a month. Syscom was to receive $600,000 for
these services over this period. (Ex. 1, 75.)
53.

The Management Agreement provided that Syscom would perform all listed

services, including constructing the system, for a monthly flat fee. When the contract was
negotiated, there were no discussions relating to Syscom charging Cellcom separately for the work
of Syscom's employees or technicians. (R. 580-581, 761.) Cellcom never agreed to or
understood that the Management Agreement would permit Syscom to charge Cellcom for its own
employees' time. The $10,000 a month fee was for Syscom's services, including the services of

its employees. (R. 531-532, 580-581.) Before Cellcom took over the system on March 20,
1991, it was never informed by Syscorn that it was charging Cellcom for the time of its
employees. (R. 656.) The invoices reflecting "tech hour" (or employee) charges offered no detail
of how hundreds of hours of "technicians'" time had been spent. (R. 555-557; Ex. 2, 10, 13.)
Mr. Sorensen said he never billed Cellcom for his time as tech hours. (R. 719.) Mr. Sorensen
thought the tech hours were allowed under % 4(a) of the Management Agreement. (R. 718.)
Syscom improperly charged and received from Cellcom $32,072.50 for hours worked by Syscom
employees, and for hours worked by Neal Sorensen himself. The tech hours were not part of
Syscom's bid to build the system. (R. 621.) Syscom prepared no billings or reimbursement
requests for tech hours until after the contract had been terminated on March 20, 1991. (R. 656,
714; Exs. 25, 33, 34, 35, 37, 42, 43.)
54.

The Management Agreementflflf3, 10) expressly provided that Syscom would "at

its own expense" provide telephone services and office services to Cellcom. Consequently, its
claims against Cellcom for its own telephone and office expenses were not paid by Cellcom.
55.

Syscom's request for reimbursement of $1,713.67, as reflected on Exhibit 27, is

proper to the extent that it was for travel expense reimbursement. (R. 645, Ex. 27.) It was not
paid because Syscom had spent all the money. Likewise, the charge for $1,760.00, as reflected
on Exhibit 28, is proper insofar as it was for equipment and parts. However, $326.00 worth of
parts, as reflected on Exhibit 28, was never received. The balance was not paid because Syscom
had spent all the money. (R. 646; Ex. 28.) Subscriber fees for customers were obtained in
amounts of $4,800 and $2,258.01 were payable, but were not paid because Syscom had not
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identified the identity of the subscribers, and had spent all the money. (R. 647-648; Ex. 30 and
31.)
56.

Cellcom assumed control of the system on the morning of March 20, 1991. On

that same day, Neal Sorensen withdrew $4,237.20, the balance then present in the Cellcom bank
accounts, without Cellcom's knowledge, permission or authority. (R. 598,740-744; Exs. 65, 66.)
57.

Syscom failed to account for the money it expended. There was $376,518.93

available to Syscom at the inception of the project. Relying on Syscom's bid to construct the sites
for $205,477, Motorola budgeted $220,000 for construction, plus $10,000 per month for twelve
months [October 1990 through September 1991], or $120,000, a total of $340,000 to construct
and operate the system. (R. 547, 624, 654, 655, 662, 668; Ex. 14.) In November 1990 Syscom
had run out of money, expending over $376,518.93. (R. 569.) When Syscom exhausted the
funding, there should have been enough money to pay the $10,000-per-month fee for another ten
months, plus $36,500 surplus that the original funding provided. (R. 547, 569, 624, 662.)
Syscom provided no accounting of how this $136,500 was expended or why none of it was
available. (Ex. 73; R. 638, 814.) Nor did Syscom account for how the construction funds were
expended. (R. 669.) Even at trial Syscom still presented no sufficient documentary evidence
accounting for how these funds were expended. (R. 538; Ex. 73 and 74.) Ledgers, seen for the
first time at trial (Ex. 73, 74), did not include invoices, a beginning balance or an ending balance.
(R. 638, 814.) Mr. Sorensen admitted that the ledgers were not sufficient to conduct an
accounting. (R. 814.)
58.

The dollar amounts listed on the three mechanic's liens were derived from invoices

that Syscom claimed reflected monies owed it by Cellcom. (R. 826-827; Ex. 76.) In reviewing
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the invoices, Mr. Sorensen could not tell which invoice listed service or materials improved which
site. (R. 673-677.)
59.

Syscorn failed to negotiate landline interconnection agreements, or perform many

other contract duties, including negotiating for roaming agreements. (R. 774.) Mr. Sorensen said
he completed the interconnection agreements. (R. 777.)
60.

Marie Bagshaw was an employee of Cellcom from 1989 until 1993. (R. 1396,

Affidavit of Dennis O'Neill t 2, offered with Plaintiffs Rule 59 motions; evidence rejected by
Court's Ruling, November 9, 1995, R. 1307.)
61.

During that period, she had control and possession of documents associated with

the Utah-5 market. She was the only Cellcom employee with knowledge of Sy scorn's activities.
She was the only witness for Cellcom during the October 1992 bench trial. (Id. at t 3.) She was
Cellcom's representative in Utah for purposes of this litigation. She was to have assisted
Cellcom's attorneys in their preparation of the case. (Id. at f 4.)
62.

In 1993, long after the trial was completed, Mr. Dennis O'Neill discovered that

Marie Bagshaw had purposefully deceived him with regard to Utah-5 operations. Among other
things, she had failed to inform Cellcom's attorneys of facts directly relevant to the litigation with
Syscom, including gross accounting irregularities and problems with the cellular system that she
discovered after Cellcom had assumed control of the system in March 1991. (Id. at f 5.)
63.

Ms. Bagshaw's deception of Mr. O'Neill and Cellcom's attorneys prevented them

from discovering relevant evidence about Syscom's improper activities, breach of contract, and
other evidence relevant to this litigation. As a result, Cellcom was unable to present a complete
case in October of 1992. (Id^ at f 6.)
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64.

O'Neill has had a relationship with Motorola since 1985 and was not introduced

to Motorola by Neal Sorensen. (R. 1369, Affidavit of Dennis O'Neill, f 7, offered with
Cellcom's Rule 59 motions; rejected by court in its Nov. 9, 1995 Ruling, R. 1307.) In order to
file applications for the FCC lottery, Cellcom took many steps to qualify for financing with
Motorola. (Id at 1 10.)
65.

Upon earning the right to construct the cellular systems in Utah-5 and PA-11,

Cellcom entered into financing agreements, among other agreements, with Motorola that provided
that the permits, assets and physical improvements in each market cross-collateralized the loans
in the other market (in addition to other assets pledged). For example, if Cellcom defaulted on
its Utah-5 loan, Motorola had the right to foreclose on the Utah-5 permit, property and assets or
on the PA-11 permit, property and assets, or both. (Id at t 14.)
66.

Due to Syscom's failure to account for the monies that it spent, Motorola declared

Cellcom in default of the Utah-5 loan, and among other things, foreclosed on both the Utah-5 and
PA-11 permits, property and assets. (Id, at t 15.)
67.

A few months before the foreclosures, Cellcom received a bona fide offer to

purchase the construction permit, property and assets for PA-11 for $9,000,000 cash. Cellcom
did not accept the offer. (Id at 16.) Due to Syscom's breach of contract in failing to account,
Cellcom lost the PA-11 market valued at $9,000,000. (IdJ
68.

An accounting was completed during pendency of the first appeal, which shows

substantial losses suffered by Cellcom due to Syscom's mismanagement, misappropriation of
funds, and other contract violations. For instance, the accounting shows:
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a.

Syscom paid itself $107,638.54 for a few months work, far in excess of the

$10,000 per month management fee;
b.

Syscom spent $189,093.26 on equipment, although all telecommunication

equipment was supplied directly by Motorola;
c.

Syscom spent $7,511.53 of Cellcom's money on office expenses when the

Management Agreement provided that Syscom would run the office "at its own expense";
d.

Syscom spent $11,708.54 of Cellcom's money on telephone expenses when

the contract specifically provided that Syscom would provide the telephone line at "its own
expense." (IdL at \ 18 and Ex. B [accounting].)
69.

The above-recited accounting evidence could not have been produced at trial

because Cellcom had still not received all receipts, invoices, checks, ledgers and the like from
Syscom despite repeated discovery requests. It was not until after the trial that Cellcom hired a
certified public accountant to go through Syscom's incomplete records to determine what was still
missing, reconstruct missing information from bank accounts, recreate ledgers, and to fully
account for the hundreds of thousands of dollars spent by Syscom. QcL at f 20.)
70.

Some of this evidence was not collected by Cellcom's attorneys because they did

not have sufficient time before trial. Knowing that they were not prepared, and for other reasons,
attorneys Heaton and Schow of Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler, moved to withdraw so other counsel
could more completely investigate and try the case. The court denied the motion four days before
trial and the case went forward without Cellcom's lawyers being sufficiently prepared. (l± at
120.)
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71.

Mr. Sorensen did not promote the business. He did not perform any marketing

functions.

He failed to ensure that roaming agreements were reached with other cellular

companies. (Id.)
72.

There were many problems with the system when Cellcom took it over in March

1991. Cellcom was not aware of the many problems, as its agent Marie Bagshaw either did not
know of the problems or did not inform attorneys Heaton, Schow and Eckersley of those
problems. Some of those problems were as follows:
a.

The Asphalt Ridge cell site tower was installed at the wrong location.

Cellcom's FAA and FCC filings specified the exact location of the tower. Syscom moved the
tower to a different location and then informed Cellcom. This required expensive re-engineering
and additional FAA and FCC filings.
b.

The Blue Bench cell site location was also moved, again by Syscom without

Cellcom's knowledge, and this time Syscom did not inform Cellcom it had moved the tower.
Again, expensive re-engineering and additional government filings were required.
c.

At the Asphalt Ridge site no FCC licenses were posted as required by law.

No fire extinguishers were included. Nofirst-aidkit was included in the building. The air filter
was the wrong kind. The building was built too small. There were holes in the building,
allowing numerous insects to infiltrate. There were numerous loose nuts, bolts and screws and
expensive telecommunication equipment was not secured or fastened properly to the walls,
ceilings or floors.
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d.

The microwave, a critical piece of equipment that was installed from the

Asphalt Ridge cell site to the Vernal MTSO building, was the wrong piece of equipment as it was
not redundant. That is, if that microwave went down, the whole system would also be down.
e.

Weather stripping was not installed in the Blue Bench building and

improperly installed in the Asphalt Ridge and MTSO buildings. The Blue Bench tower was bent,
probably caused by a guy wire being incorrectly installed. The grounding of the Blue Bench
equipment racks was not completed. The Blue Bench microwave was also not redundant.
f.

The Vernal MTSO site had extensive cracking of the asphalt installed

around the circumference of the building causing swelling and water infiltration into the building.
g.

The doors in all three sites leaked water, dirt and insects allowing the

buildings that were suppose to be air tight to be infested with bugs, cobwebs and scorpions.
h.

The telephone lines from and to the sites were not completed as required.

None of the coax cables were provided with ice shields as required.
i.

About 30 or 40 safety locking nuts were missing on the towers, causing the

towers to be very dangerous. No lightning protection was provided on the towers.
j.

Against Cellcom's express orders, Syscom used Cellcom's money to employ

Cellcom's engineering firm to engineer Syscom's own communications site at Little Mountain and
caused it to be treated as one of Cellcom's sites as indicated on the Cellular Geographic Service
Area (CGSA) maps. The CGSA maps at the time continually show Little Mountain as one of
Cellcom's sites when it was not, and when, in fact, it belonged to Syscom. Mr. O'Neill suspects
Syscom used Cellcom's money to improve the site by having an expensive power line run up the
mountain to their site.
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k.

System manuals and documentation left behind by Syscom were in a mess.

The upgrades were not put in the manuals and old manuals were intermingled with new manuals.
(R. 1365 at 119 and attachments thereto.)
73.

Syscom did not develop any sales agents as was required in the Management

Agreement. (Id.)
74.

In February 1992, before John R. Anderson took the bench, he was a partner in

the two-person firm of Beaslin & Anderson. (Affidavit of Andrew M. Morse, 11 3, 4; R. 1341.)
75.

During that month, Neal Sorensen, President of Syscom, proposed to sell his

shares back to Syscom. (Affidavit of Rodney Hauer, 11 2-4; R. 1214.)
76.

McKeachnie & Allred, Syscom and Neal Sorensen's lawyers in this action, drafted

a detailed Stock Purchase Agreement ("Agreement") whereby Syscom would purchase Neal
Sorensen's stock for $72,000 over four years with interest as reflected in the Agreement attached
to the Affidavit of Rod Hauer. (l± at f 5.)
77.

Mr. Hauer then became president of Syscom. McKeachnie & Allred had a conflict

of interest in representing Neal Sorensen (the seller) and Syscom (the buyer) in the transaction and
sent Syscom to Beaslin & Anderson to be represented by that firm. QdL at 11 6-7.)
78.

Beaslin & Anderson accepted the employment of Syscom and Rod Hauer.

Beaslin & Anderson, through Mr. Beaslin, represented Syscom and Rod Hauer in the Agreement
which was signed in February 1992, but was to be performed over the next four years. (Id, at
11 7-8.)
79.

Judge John R. Anderson was appointed to the bench in July 1992 and took the

bench in September 1992.

80.

Counsel for plaintiff discovered Beaslin & Anderson's involvement with Syscom

when this lawsuit was tentatively settled in late July 1995. (Aff. of Andrew M. Morse 1 3;
R. 1341.) At that time, counsel did not know Judge Anderson had been associated with Attorney
Beaslin. (Id i atf4.)
81.

The Agreement referred to the instant litigation and made provisions for the

division of any judgment awarded to Syscom. (R. 1210.)
82.

During the August 21, 1995 hearing on plaintiffs motion to enforce an oral

settlement agreement, the Agreement was entered as an exhibit. Judge Anderson read the
Agreement, that expressly listed his firm as representing the defendant, but said nothing about an
appearance of impropriety or impartiality. (Affidavit of Andrew M. Morse, 1 5; R. 1341.)
83.

From the court's silence and his duty under U.C.A. § 78-7-1(1) and Canon 3 of

the Utah Code of Judicial Conduct, to disclose prior representation of Syscom, plaintiffs counsel
concluded that either Beaslin & Anderson had in fact not represented Syscom, or that the court
had disclosed its representation of Syscom to prior counsel for Cellcom, Messrs. Schow, Heaton
and Eckersley, of Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler, and received their consent to continue on the case.
OiL at 16.)
84.

On August 22, 1995, Mr. Morse contacted Mr. Eckersley, who reported that he

knew nothing of Judge Anderson's representation of Syscom and that no disclosure had been
made. He promised to check with Mr. Schow, but warned Mr. Schow was no longer with the
firm and plaintiff's counsel could not locate him. (14. at 7.)
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85.

On August 25, 1995, Mr. Morse spoke with Mr. Beaslin who confirmed that

Beaslin & Anderson had represented Syscom as indicated in the Stock Purchase Agreement. Q$L
at 1 9.)
86.

On October 3, 1995, plaintiffs counsel learned from Mr. Eckersley that Judge

Anderson had not disclosed to Mr. Schow, or Mr. Heaton that his firm had represented Syscom.
Mr. Eckersley apologized for the delay in finding Mr. Schow, as his whereabouts after having left
Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler had been unknown. (IcL at \ 9.)
87.

Plaintiff moved to recuse Judge Anderson on October 11, 1995. (R. 1050.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Syscom's counterclaim fails because it arises from Syscom's work as a contractor while
Syscom was unlicensed. The trial court's holding that Syscom could recover because it was
Cellcom's agent, and therefore not a contractor, is wrong, because even an agent must be licensed
if it does contracting work within the meaning of the Utah Construction Trades Licensing Act,
U.C.A.§ 58-55-101 et seq. (1995).
Syscom was not entitled to recover because it failed to prove that it had completely
performed the subject contract: it grossly overspent, failed to account for monies spent, and failed
to perform other contract duties. The court's refusal to make these findings was clearly
erroneous.

Rather, the court should have found that Syscom's breaches caused Cellcom

substantial damages. Further, the court abused its discretion by failing to reopen the case or order
a new trial to consider additional detailed evidence of Syscom's breaches and Cellcom's damages.
Finally, the court erred by failing to recuse itself. A few months before hearing this case,
the court's two-person firm represented Syscom on a transaction related to this litigation, raising

the specter that the court may have had a financial interest in the case, and creating the appearance
of impartiality sufficient to warrant recusal.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THERE IS NOT SUBSTANTIAL COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO
SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT
SYSCOM WAS NOT A CONTRACTOR UNDER THE UTAH
CONSTRUCTION TRADES LICENSING ACT.
Syscom's counterclaim against Cellcom must fail unless Syscom was not engaged as a
contractor under Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-101 et seq. (1995), the Utah Construction Trades
Licensing Act ("Act"), or unless Syscom qualified for a statutory or common law exception to
the licensing requirement. American Rural Cellular. 890 P.2d at 1036. Cellcom presented
evidence at trial that Syscom fell within two statutory definitions of contractor: (1) any person
who represents himself to be a contractor by advertising or any other means; and (2) a
construction manager who performs management and counseling services on a construction project
for a fee. Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-102(b) and (e) (1995). Nonetheless, the trial court determined
on remand, without addressing either of these statutory definitions, that Syscom was not a
contractor, but was Cellcom's "agent."
The court erroneously concluded that because Syscom was Cellcom's agent, it need not
be licensed under the Act. This conclusion is at odds with the Act, the fundamental premise of
which is that persons who perform services in the "construction trade" must be licensed:
Any person engaged in the construction trades licensed under this Chapter, or as
a contractor regulated under this Chapter, shall become licensed under this Chapter
before engaging in the trades or contracting activity in this state unless specifically
exempted from licensure under § 58-55-305.
-24-

Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-301 (1995). "Construction trades" are defined as:
Any trade or occupation involving construction, alteration, remodeling, repairing,
wrecking or demolition, addition to or improvements of any building, highway,
road, railroad, dam, bridge, structure, excavation or other project, development
or improvement to other than personal property.
Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-102(6) (1995). The exceptions to the licensing requirement, contained
in U.C.A. § 58-55-305 (1995), make no exception for "agents." Finally, the very bar to recovery
at issue here expressly prohibits contractors from being "agents":
No contractor may act as an agent or commence or maintain any action in any
court of the state for collection of compensation for performing any act for which
a license is required by this Chapter without alleging and proving that he was a
properly licensed contractor . . . .
U.C.A. § 58-55-604 (1995) (emphasis added). Thus, because Syscom was performing a
construction trade due to its "construction . . . [of a] building [and] road [to the sites]" under
U.C.A. § 58-55-102(6) (1995), it was required to be licensed. U.C.A. § 58-55-301 (1995).
This conclusion is consistent with case law where courts look not to the labels attached to
relationships between owners and contractors, but instead to the actual work performed to
determine whether a license is required. For example, in Reidy v. Blackwell. 681 P.2d 916
(Ariz. App. 1983), the purported "agent" brought an action against an owner to recover wages
and a fixed fee owed under a contract to build a house. The "agent" was not a licensed
contractor. The court upheld summary judgment for the owner relying on A.R.S. § 32-1153, an
identical statutory bar to U.C.A. § 58-55-604 (1995). The court examined the obligations,
responsibilities and work performed by the "agent," and concluded that "there can be no doubt
that Reidy was acting under this agreement as a contractor within the meaning A.R.S. § 32-1101,"
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and that Reidy was barred from suing because he was not licensed. See also. Columbia Group
Inc. v. Home Owner's Association. 727 P.2d 352 (Ariz. App. 1986).
The court's designation of Syscom as an "agent" is, therefore, irrelevant under the Act.
If it was a contractor under the Act, it needed to be licensed in order to bring its counterclaim.
Even if relevant, the question of whether Syscom acted as Cellcom's agent or as an
independent contractor1 is only relevant to the construction phase of the project, since Syscom
could only file mechanics' liens for monies claimed from the construction phase of the project,
and not to recover the intangible service fees it claims Cellcom owed it once the system was built.
Thus, any indication that Syscom seemed like an agent once the system was built is irrelevant to
Syscom's status as a contractor under the Act.2
A.

Syscom Would Have To Be Under Cellcom's Daily Control During the
Construction Phase of the Project in Order To Be Its Agent.

An agency relationship may result when one is subject to control as to the means employed
to accomplish a result or perform a job, while an independent contractor relationship arises when
one is not under such control. Thiokol Chemical Corporation v. Peterson. 15 Utah 2d 355, 393
P.2d 391, 359 n.6 (Utah 1964). In Glover v. Boy Scouts of America. 299 Utah Adv. Rep. 10
(Utah 1996), the Utah Supreme Court discussed the amount of control necessary to establish an

1

One may be an independent contractor for some purposes and an agent for other purposes. See Gordon v.
CRS Consulting Engineers. Inc.. 820 P.2d 492 (Utah App. 1991) (status as independent contractor and agent are not
always mutually exclusive). Thus, even if this Court determined that Syscom acted as Cellcom's agent for some
purposes, this should not detract from the relevant inquiry: whether Syscom was a contractor as defined under Utah
statute.
2

This Court observed that Syscom could also file mechanics' liens if it fell within a statutory exemption to
licensing. The trial court based its award to Syscom for improvements covered under the liens solely on its
determination that Syscom was not a contractor, not that it fell within one of the statutory or common law exemptions
to the Act. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 11).
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agency relationship and concluded that a scoutmaster was not an agent of Boy Scouts of America
("BSA"). The plaintiff contended that BSA exerted sufficient control over scoutmasters to deem
them agents, because BSA prohibited scoutmasters from taking major departures from BSA
policies or from undertaking certain dangerous activities, required them to wear specific uniforms,
required them to seek permission before their troops raised funds, and provided scoutmaster
training and suggestions for troop activities. Nonetheless, the court viewed this evidence as
insufficient as a matter of law to establish an agency relationship. Glover. 299 Utah Adv. Rep.
at 13-14. BSA was not the principal of the scoutmaster because it did not "retain the right to
control day-to-day troop operations." R at 12. See also Foster v. Steed. 432 P.2d 60, 63 (Utah
1967) (Texaco franchisee was not agent even though Texaco instructed it on marketing and
operations because Texaco did not retain day-to-day control, but "merely influenced the result to
be achieved.")
There must be substantial competent evidence that Cellcom controlled Syscom's daily
activities during the construction phase of the project before Syscorn can properly be called
Cellcom's agent. Without such evidence, Syscom was an independent contractor required to be
licensed.
B.

Even Marshaling All Conceivable Evidence That Syscom Was Cellcom's
Agent. This Evidence Does Not Sufficiently Show That Svscom Was an
Agent During the Construction Phase of the Project.

The trial court based its determination that Syscom was Cellcom's agent on the following
factors: Syscom arranged the financing for the project by introducing Cellcom to Motorola,
which provided financing for the construction phase (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
["F's and C's"] ^ 1); Syscom completed the interface with US West Communications (Id.):

Syscom did the electrical and telephonic systems engineering to get the system up and running
(Id.): Syscom did whatever was necessary with Cellcom's blessing (Id.): as construction
progressed, the parties communicated about the progressions "nearly daily," and Cellcom directed
Syscom to withdraw money and send it to Cellcom in Florida (F's and C's, t 7).
The only other "evidence" suggesting that Syscom was an agent appears in the
Management Agreement, which states that Syscom was to construct the system "subject to
Cellcom's exclusive right of unfettered control over business assets, facilities, operations, and
policy decisions." Significantly, no unfettered control is reserved over construction activities.
Instead, the Management Agreement provided that Syscom would supervise construction of the
system, but keep Cellcom apprised of the status of such activities at all times. Finally, the
Management Agreement declared that any contract Syscom recommend be executed for the
construction of the system be approved by Cellcom.
The above "evidence" does not constitute substantial competent evidence of an agency
relationship. Glover, supra. The evidence that Mr. Sorensen introduced Cellcom to Motorola
and arranged financing is not competent. Cellcom had had a relationship with Motorola since
1985 and was not introduced to Motorola by Mr. Sorensen. Cellcom had been negotiating with
several vendors, including Motorola, prior to Syscom's involvement with Cellcom. Significantly,
no one from Cellcom or Motorola confirmed Mr. Sorensen's assertion. Even if competent
evidence existed that Syscom arranged for financing, the trial court failed to explain how this fact
made Syscom an agent.
Similarly, the other evidence relied on by the trial court to support its conclusion that
Syscom was an agent merely indicates that Syscom was performing certain activities on behalf of
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Cellcom with the goal of constructing the system. Syscom could have completed the interface and
the "electronic and telephonic systems engineering"3 in the capacity of an agent, independent
contractor, partner, or something else. The facts that it communicated "almost daily" with
Cellcom and apprised it of activities does not mean that Cellcom dictated the activities and the
method of performing them. The crucial evidence, that Syscom performed the above at the
direction and under the control of Cellcom, is missing. In fact, the trial court's statement that
Syscom did "whatever was necessary with Plaintiff's blessing," suggests that Syscom was an
independent contractor who enjoyed a great degree of freedom in determining what was necessary
to construct the system and then doing it, with a rubber stamp approval from Cellcom.
There is also a smattering of evidence in Finding No. 7 that might support the court's
finding that Syscom was an agent of Cellcom. The court therein found "the parties' actions
indicate their recognition that A.R.C. was in total control, and could direct, and at times did
direct, how work was to be performed and how money was spent." Yet the court's cites to pages
R. 653 and 654 do not support the finding in any respect. The testimony on those pages simply
indicates that a certain amount of money was available to construct and manage the system for a
year and that at times Cellcom directed that certain money should be transferred to it in Florida
or to its attorneys in Washington D.C. That the Management Agreement indicated that Cellcom
retained the unfettered discretion to control its assets and facilities, does not mean that Syscom
was an agent for these purposes. "Retaining a right to supervise or inspect, without more, does
not establish control. (Citations omitted.) Rather, the evidence must tend to establish control or
3

There is no cite to the record for this finding. The evidence is that an East Coast engineering firm did radio
frequency studies to determine where the sites should be located. In addition, Mr. Sorensen was not, nor was anybody
else at Syscom, educated or licensed as an engineer.

the right to control the manner of performance." (Citations omitted.) United Employer's
Insurance Co. v. Mentor. 1996 W.L. 509559 (Wash. App. Div. 1 (September 1996)).
Here, although Cellcom had a right to control how its money was spent, it did not exercise
control over how construction monies were spent. Rather, it let Syscom decide how the money
should be spent to best build the system, which Syscom said it could build, promised to build, was
capable of building and did, to some extent, build. The evidence is undisputed that no one from
Cellcom controlled any aspect of Syscom's construction operation. No one from Cellcom visited
Utah during the construction phase of the operation. Marie Bagshaw visited Utah only after
construction was substantially completed in January 1991. The court found that "plaintiff and its
engineers supervised Syscom." (F's and C's, K 16.) The court cites no evidence for this Finding,
aside from the Management Agreement without reference to page or paragraph number.
Engineers from the East Coast plotted where the sites should be located, and then had no more
association with the project. There is no evidence that any engineer hired by Cellcom, or anybody
from Cellcom, supervised Syscom while Syscom built the system.
In review, although the Management Agreement contains language stating Syscom would
operate the system subject to Cellcom's right to control assets, facilities, operations and policy
decisions, the Management Agreement itself expressly states that Syscom was an independent
contractor. (Ex. 1, pp. 1-2.) This Court noted that the parties expressly disavowed any agency
relationship between them. American Rural Cellular. 890 P.2d at 1038. The evidence supporting
a conclusion that Syscom was a contractor, on the other hand, is much more substantial.
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C.

Substantial Competent Evidence Exists That Syscom Was a Contractor.

There is "ample" evidence that Syscom fit the statutory definition of a contractor by
"represent[ing] [itself] to be a contractor by advertising or any other means." U.C.A. § 58-55102(7)(b) (1995), American Rural Cellular. 890 P.2d at 1038. This Court noted that Marie
Bagshaw testified that Syscom represented to Cellcom that it itself could construct, or contract for
the construction of, the buildings needed for the cellular telephone system. Ms. Bagshaw stated
that Syscom showed Cellcom buildings and towers it had previously erected for other jobs, and
that Syscom's president stated Syscom was qualified to "help build the system and to help
construct the buildings and whatever needed to be done." Syscom's president further admitted
that he made these representations for the purpose of convincing Cellcom to use Syscom to
perform the construction phase of the project. Syscom listed itself as the general and electrical
contractor on Cellcom's building permit applications. Finally, the Management Agreement
expressly declares that Syscom is Cellcom's independent contractor and not its agent. American
Rural Cellular. 890 P.2d at 1037-1038.4
Not only does this Court have substantial evidence to conclude Syscom was a contractor
because it represented itself as a contractor under § 58-55-102(7)(b), there is "ample support" that

4

Although the trial court did not address on remand whether Syscom represented itself to be a contractor
through advertising or other means, this Court observed that Syscom's president testified at trial that Syscom was "a
telephone and radio company, as well as we did a lot of other forms of technical wireless communications."
American Rural Cellular. 890 P.2d at 1039. There is no evidence that Syscom represented that it was a telephone
and radio company and not a contractor at the relevant times, i.e. when Cellcom was searching for a builder for the
system and while Syscom was building the system. The Management Agreement makes no mention of Syscom being
a telephone company.
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Syscom was a contractor because it acted as a construction manager performing management and
counseling services on a construction project for a fee under § 58-55-102(7)(e).5
Furthermore, Syscom's president undertook on-site management of the construction and
was the responsible person from Syscom to see that the cellular system was constructed. The
contract specifically required Syscom to construct the buildings and towers. (Ex. 1, pp. 3-4.)
Syscom provided a detailed bid to get the job, just like any contractor. It alone hired and paid
subcontractors to perform various tasks. It had to account for construction monies spent.
Significantly, it saw itself as a contractor when it employed the contractor's lever- the mechanic's
lien. Finally, the trial court found that the $10,000 per month service fee was a fee for
"management services" presumably rendered during construction. (F's and C's, K 6.)
Syscom qualified as a construction contractor under U.C.A. § 58-55-102(7)(b) and (e)
(1995). It was required under the Act to be licensed. U.C.A. § 58-55-301 (1995). Because it
was never licensed, the trial court erred in determining that it could recover under its action to
foreclose the mechanics' liens. U.C.A. § 58-55-604 (1995).6

5

Marie Bagshaw testified that the $10,000 service fee provided for Syscom's compensation in the
Management Agreement came out of the construction account, with respect to which "you could only do a draw down
after you had completed a phase of the construction." She testified that "that was always the understanding that we
had with the Management Agreement. . . was that the $10,000 per month was a construction fee for Syscom for the
use of their people to help construct the system." Ms. Bagshaw also testified that Syscom paid all of its subcontractors
and suppliers directly, that none of those invoices ever came through Cellcom's office, and that Mr. Sorensen never
asked for authorization to make any construction-related expenditure or to pay anyone. American Rural Cellular. 890
P.2d at 1038-1039.
6

Despite this Court's directive in Cellcom I. the trial court did not apply the evidence to the Act, and did not
therefore address whether any of the statutory or common law exceptions apply, apparently conceding that none do.
Cellcom, therefore, will not address this issue.
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D.

No Other Significant Findings Are Supported by the Evidence.

Two other signficant Findings are not supported by substantial confident evidence. They
are that Cellcom breached the contract by failing to communicate with Syscom (F's and C's,
t 11); and that the construction completed by Syscom was reasonably priced, completed in a
workmanlike manner, and that Cellcom was satisfied with the system. (F's and C's, W 14, 16.)
The court found that Cellcom breached the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing by
ceasing to communicate with Syscom, and that its failure to communicate "commenced several
months prior to the termination of the agreement [March 20, 1991]," citing to R. 571. On that
page, Ms. Bagshaw identified the February 1991 letter from her to Mr. Sorensen wherein she
requested substantial documents and financial records from Syscom; she also identified Mr.
Sorensen's return letter dated February 11. She admits that communications at this point were
not as regular as they had been. "Neal and I had phone calls, but not on a regular basis. They
were sparse at this point." (R. 571.) That is all the evidence that the court cites. In arguable
support of this finding, Mr. Sorensen testified that he had "no communication" with Cellcom
beginning at the end of January. He quickly retracted and admitted that Ms. Bagshaw "did talk
to me one or two times during that period of time." (R. 819-820.) That is the extent of the
evidence in support Finding No. 11.
There is overwhelming evidence to dispute the finding. Ms. Bagshaw denied that she
failed to communicate with Mr. Sorensen between late January and March 20. She had several
phone calls with him. Specifically on March 1 she called him and talked "at length about the
problems with the system." (R. 605-606.) They also discussed how many customers were online,
and whether to hire a direct sales person. She explained to him that "We have a problem. We

are unhappy with what is going on." Q$L) In addition, Ms. Bagshaw visited Syscom in Vernal,
Utah traveling there from Florida by the end of January 1991. She met with Mr. Sorensen,
explained the problems, requested documents and was told by him that the documents had already
been sent to her office in Florida. After she returned to Florida, and still no documents had
arrived in the mail, she again communicated with Mr. Sorensen by sending him a registered letter
on February 7, 1991, again detailing the various problems with the system and requesting specific
documents. On February 11, Mr. Sorensen sent a reply letter, again promising to deliver
documents. None of those documents were ever delivered. The court's finding, therefore, is
clearly erroneous because it is "against the clear weight of the evidence." Cal. Wadsworth
Constr. v. City of St. George. 898 P.2d 1372, 1378 (Utah 1995), quoting State v. Walker. 743
P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987).
The court's finding that the system was completed at a reasonable price and that Cellcom
was well satisfied, is against the clear weight of the evidence. (F's and C's, t1f 14, 16.) Evidence
in favor of this finding is Ms. Bagshaw's testimony; she testified that the construction costs listed
on Syscom's exhibits were pretty close to the bids; but they did not include the tens of thousands
of dollars in man hours and tech hours that Syscom claimed. She also testified that the construction was completed, that it was done in a workmanlike manner and it was done quickly.
(R. 626.) She also admits that the invoices prepared by Syscom reflect work that was actually
performed and items actually purchased, with the exception of the tech hours discussed above.
(R. 663.) This is the extent of the evidence in support of the finding.
This is not substantial competent evidence because there is no evidence that items Syscom
purchased or work it performed were reasonably necessary, or that the prices charged were
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reasonable. There is also no evidence that the tens of thousands of dollars worth of equipment
was actually installed, a relevant inquiry in light of Motorola's supply and installation of much,
if not all, of the electronic equipment, leaving little or nothing for Syscom to buy or install.
The system was not completed in a workmanlike manner. Ms. Bagshaw testified that
initially she thought the system was completed satisfactorily, but later found out that much of the
electrical wiring at all the sites were done very poorly, in violation of the National Electric Code,
and that much of the wiring had to be redone. Other problems were later discovered: the cell
sites had been built on the wrong spots requiring additional engineering and surveying work and
additional filings with the FCC and Federal Aeronotics Administration [FAA]; buildings were not
airtight as required; towers were bent; equipment was not bolted to the floor, ceilings and walls
as required. In sum, the buildings were not constructed in a workmanlike manner.
The most important erroneous finding was that products and services rendered by Syscom
were done at a reasonable price. Had it been done at a reasonable price, this lawsuit would never
have risen. As Cellcom has adequately proven, Syscom spent way too much money, far beyond
the budget amounts to complete the tasks assigned. The finding is clearly erroneous.
POINT II
SYSCOM FAILED TO SATISFY CONTRACTUAL CONDITIONS PRECEDENT, EXCUSING CELLCOM'S OBLIGATION
TO PERFORM.
Syscom breached material conditions precedent, excusing Cellcom from its duty to pay or
reimburse Syscom. Conversely, because of Syscom's undisputed breaches, it failed to prove that
it fully and completely performed the contract, thus it is not entitled to contract payment. Rather,
Cellcom is entitled to judgment against Syscom for breach of contract.

The facts, as stated above, detail Syscom's breaches and the damages suffered by Cellcom.
Essentially, Syscom had $376,518.93 at its disposal, which was more than enough to build the
system and then operate it from October 1990 through September 1991. In November 1990
Syscom had spent all the money, and could not account for it. In November 1990 only
$240,018.93 should have spent; there should have been $136,500.00 left in the account. In
addition, Syscom claims it is entitled to an additional $86,374.40. Therefore, Syscom admits it
spent $462,893.33 ($376,518.93 plus $86,374.40), when it should have only spent far less than
$300,000.00. Syscom's claims are factually and legally groundless.
Syscom's full and complete performance of the contract was a condition precedent to
Cellcom's duty to pay Syscom. "Failure of a material condition precedent relieves the other party
of any obligation to perform." Kinsman v. Kinsman. 748 P.2d 210 (Utah App. 1988). Here
Syscom failed to perform several material conditions precedent, thereby excusing Cellcom's
obligation to pay any further monies to Syscom.
The contract required Syscom to construct the cell sites, operate the system, follow good
business practice, and to accurately account for every dollar spent.7
Syscom was responsible for the "fdlevelopment. implementation and maintenance of
financial controls and procedures, including relationships with financial institutions, to insure

7

Cellcom wishes to engage Syscom . . . as an independent contractor to manage the construction, operation,
periodic redesign and maintenance of the cellular telecommunications system and business for the permit area. (Ex.
1,75, pp. 1-2).
Syscom shall perform all services under this Management Agreement under a fiduciary relationship with
Cellcom in accordance with the reasonable standards of honesty, integrity and fair dealing, and in a professional
manner that will best serve thefinancialand business interests of Cellcom in the permit area. Svscom's performance
under this Management Agreement shall comply in all material respects with good business practices in the industry.
(Id. at p. 3) (emphasis added)
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efficient collection and deposit, investment and disbursement of funds in the name and on behalf
of Cellcom." (Management Agreement Ex. 1, at p. 4) (emphasis added).
Syscom was also responsible for the "[development and maintenance of financial record
keeping procedures and maintenance of records of all transactions relating to the construction and
operation of the system ." (Id.) (emphasis added). The contract provided:
Syscom shall provide Cellcom with access, upon reasonable notice and reasonable
times, to the books and records maintained by Syscom with respect to the system.
Syscom recognizes Cellcom's need to have the right to conduct full and complete
audits without limitation, all at Cellcom's expense." QcL at p. 9)
Syscom was required to fully and completely perform all aspects of the contract before it
was entitled to compensation: "As compensation for full and proper compliance with the terms
of this Management Agreement, Syscom shall be entitled to [listed compensation]." (Id. p. 12)
(emphasis added). Syscom breached each of the above quoted material conditions precedent. It
did not fully and completely perform the contract and was not entitled to compensation.
Syscom failed to " develop[] and maintain[] financial record keeping procedures and
maintainQ records of all transactions relating to the construction and operation of the system."
Cellcom repeatedly asked Syscom for all financial records so that Cellcom could do the accounting
that Syscom was supposed to do. Marie Bagshaw wrote letters, made phone calls and even
personally visited Syscom's offices in Vernal, all in a futile effort to obtain the financial records.
Cellcom needed the financial records in order to account to its lender, Motorola, which required
quarterly accountings in October 1990 and in January 1991. Cellcom's attempts in November
1990 and February 1991 to account to Motorola with the sketchy information supplied by Syscom
were rejected by Motorola.

Moreover, Mr. Sorensen knew that his submissions were
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unsatisfactory to Motorola, and that further financing was jeopardized by his failure to account.
He also understood that the contract required him to account for the money.
Syscom breached material conditions precedent, and cost Cellcom dearly. Not only did
it lose $136,000 that should have still been in the bank when Syscom informed Cellcom that it had
run out of money, but Motorola refused additional financing, declaring Cellcom in default for
failure to account for the loaned funds. The loans given by Motorola to Cellcom to improve the
Utah and Pennsylvania permit areas were cross-collateralized, meaning that the Utah-5 and PA-11
permits, assets and improvements secured the Utah note. When Cellcom defaulted on the Utah-5
note due to Syscom's breach, Motorola foreclosed the PA-11 and Utah-5 projects, causing
Cellcom to lose the PA-11 permit valued at approximately $9,000,000.
Syscom was also obliged to act as Cellcom's fiduciary, complying with reasonable
standards of honesty, integrity and fair dealing. (Ex. 1 & 75, p. 2). By failing and refusing to
account, overspending, and filing mechanic's liens, Syscom intentionally and with bad faith
breached material provisions of the contract.
Finally, Syscom's paying itself for "tech hours" was a material breach of another condition
precedent. The contract specified Syscom's compensation:
For the benefits conferred and the compensation to be paid to Syscom hereinafter
stated, Syscom shall, at its own expense, unless otherwise specifically stated, and
subject always to Cellcom's right of continuing control and approval, diligently
perform the following services for Cellcom: (Ex. 1,13.)
The plain meaning of this provision is that "unless otherwise specifically stated," Syscom
was to perform all listed duties including, construction and financial duties, for the compensation
specified, $10,000 a month for 60 months, a total of $600,000, plus other remunerations.
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Nowhere in the contract does it "specifically stateQ" or even so much as imply that Syscom would
be paid separately for the services of Mr. Sorensen or his employees.
Although Mr. Sorensen testified that he did not charge for his time, his own invoices
demonstrate that he charged and collected $18,247.29 for his time alone. (See Ex. 10, invoice
#14545; Ex. 11, invoice 14548; Ex. 12, invoice 14549, including $1,249.79 in "tax.") These
exhibits list only "Neal" under "Tech signature," and make no mention of anyone else working
the hours charged. Syscom breached a material condition precedent when it paid itself for
Mr. Sorensen's time, while at the same time it collected the $10,000 a month contract payment.
In addition, it never informed Cellcom that it was making these additional payments to itself.
Only after Cellcom took over the system and Syscom presented invoices for tech hours did it learn
of this breach.
Syscom's charges for its employees' time was also a material breach. In addition to the
above quoted clauses, the contract provides:
COMPENSATION
a. As compensation for full and proper compliance with the terms of this
Management Agreement. Syscom shall be entitled to the following:
(1) A Service Fee to be paid via monthly payments of $10,000 payable on
the 15th day of each month during the term of this Management Agreement. (Ex.
1,1 6, pp. 12-13)
This provision means that Syscom would be paid $10,000 a month for 60 months for "full
and proper compliance" with the contract. It did not permit Syscom to be paid $10,000 a month
for partial compliance, and then charge by the hour for the same work. Paragraph 4 of the
Management Agreement, quoted above, means that "at a minimum" the resources that Syscom
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would devote included all the efforts of Mr. Sorensen and Mr. Hauer, plus, by necessary
implication, any employee's time required to complete the contractual duties. (Ex. 1, ^ 4, p. 9).
As if that were not enough, the first quoted clause provides that for the $10,000 a month.
"Syscorn shall, at its own expense, unless otherwise specifically stated, and subject always to
Cellcom's right of continuing control and approval, diligently perform the following services for
Cellcom[.]" (Ex. 1, K 3). Simply put, Syscom was to perform the contract "at its own expense"
in exchange for $10,000 a month. Syscom did not perform the work at its own expense; rather,
it charged Cellcom for thousands of dollars' worth of its employees' time, in direct breach of the
contract.
In addition to the $18,247.29 that Mr. Sorensen collected for his own time, he also
collected $15,979.50 for his employees' time. (Ex. 43, invoice 15444; including $904.50 in
"tax"). In all, Syscom took from Cellcom's accounts $34,226.79 under the guise of "tech hours"
in direct breach of the contract. This is a material, if not egregious, breach of the condition
precedent to pay itself only $10,000 a month to perform the contract.
Each of the discussed breaches of a material condition precedent excused Cellcom's
obligation to pay Syscom the amounts it claims are owing. Kinsman v. Kinsman. 748 P.2d 210
(Utah App. 1988). In Kinsman, the parties to a divorce settled on terms whereby defendant would
assume and pay certain debts for plaintiffs benefit; in return plaintiff waived alimony "now and
forever." Defendant did not pay the bills, but filed for bankruptcy. Plaintiff moved to modify
the divorce decree, seeking alimony. The trial court granted the motion. The appeals court
affirmed, noting failure of a material condition precedent relieves the other party of any obligation
to perform.
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This same rule naturally applies to construction contracts. In Laurel Race Course. Inc.
v. Regal Construction Co. Inc.. 333 A.2d 142 (Md. 1975), a contractor sued a race track owner
for amounts allegedly due under a building contract. The contract required an engineer to certify
that the work was complete and satisfactory. No certificate was obtained. Holding that the certificate requirement was a condition precedent, the court wrote:
It is fundamental that where a contractual duty is subject to a condition precedent,
whether express or implied, there is no duty of performance and there can be no
breach by nonperformance until the condition precedent is either performed or
excused. [Citations omitted]
IcL at 327. See also. Campbell Bldg. Co. v. State Road Commission. 79 P.2d 857 (Utah 1937)
(duty to pay final payment excused by builder's failure to show all debts for construction had been
paid); Winn v. Aleda Construction Co. Inc.. 315 S.E.2d 193 (Va.1984) (builder's failure to
strictly perform excused owner's duty to pay).
As in the cited cases, Syscom's failure to account and its breach of other duties excuse
Cellcom's duty to pay the amounts claimed. Stated another way, Syscom's breaches demonstrate
that it has failed to satisfy its burden to show it fully and completely performed the contract, and
that it was therefore entitled to compensation under the contract. All breaches were material. A
fundamental duty of Syscom was to accurately and regularly account for the monies entrusted to
it. This was necessary to insure that the system was constructed within budget, that the system
was operated efficiently, and most importantly, to satisfy Motorola that its lent funds were
carefully managed within budget.
The importance of each condition precedent is demonstrated by the ramifications of its
breach. Due to Syscom's failure and refusal to account Cellcom could not account to Motorola,
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causing Motorola to declare Cellcom in default. In turn, Motorola foreclosed on the Utah-5 and
PA-11 systems, causing millions of dollars of loss to Cellcom. Syscom also breached its duty to
carefully manage the funds, spending $136,500 more than it should have by November 1990,
when it ran out of money. Even if Syscom had accounted for this money, it could not have
justified overspending by $136,500, and Motorola would have likely defaulted Cellcom, anyway.
Likewise Syscom's taking $34,226.79 for "tech hours" was a material breach, as Cellcom could
not have justified this expense to Motorola, again contributing to default.
There is overwhelming evidence that Syscom breached several material conditions
precedent. Syscom's brazen mechanic's liens on Cellcom's property and groundless counterclaim
for additional funds add fuel to the fire. Syscom squandered, lost control of, and otherwise
fumbled away $376,581.93 of Cellcom's funds that were supposed to last a year but only lasted
a few months. Having caused Cellcom to default on its obligations to Motorola and lose the PA11 permit greatly damaged Cellcom's Utah-5 business, Syscom now wants another $116,000 for
its misdeeds. "Such a result will not be tolerated." Kinsman, supra.
POINT III
SYSCOM IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER NOTHING.
Syscom should take nothing. As explained, Syscom breached several material conditions
precedent, which excuses Cellcom from its duty to pay and reimburse Syscom. Alternatively,
Syscom failed to prove that it fully, completely, diligently, and honestly fulfilled all its contractual
duties, which it was required to demonstrate to prove that it was entitled to compensation.
Even if Syscom was entitled to compensation and reimbursement, its claim is, for the most
part, barred because it was an unlicensed contractor. It claims that it is owed a total of
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$86,374.40 (Ex.77). Of this, $77,415.33 is claimed for construction work, improvements and
materials installed into the system. (Ex. 76 [summary], Ex. 49, 50, 51 [liens]). As an unlicensed
contractor its lien claims are barred, leaving only $8,958.66 of unbarred claims. Of this,
$8,872.13 is for claimed "subscriber commissions." (Ex. 30, invoice 15433, Ex. 31, invoice
14437). Syscom provided absolutely no proof that it had actually earned any commissions. No
customer names were provided, no dates of sale were provided. We have only Syscom's
unsupported invoices created after the system was taken over in March 1991.
Not only is Syscom not entitled to recover any additional funds, its breach of contract
damaged Cellcom as follows: Unjustified billings made without Cellcom's knowledge or consent
and not provided for in the contract include a $500.00 charge for office, $32,072.50 charge for
tech hours, $2,054.29 charge for tax, $2,430.06 for legal, $7,043.60 for on account and
$14,813.92 for charges for which there is no proof that it was for anything provided in the
contract, for a total of $58,987.37. This amount is only for money that Syscom paid itself that
was not provided for in the contract.

In addition, Syscom owes Cellcom $136,000 for

unaccounted-for funds. This is the amount that Syscom should have had in the bank on the day
it ran out of money in November 1990.
The mechanic's liens were improper because Syscom did not have a contractor's license.
It was obviously not entitled to collect for any charges as a contractor and therefore it could not
have had a legitimate, lawful mechanic's lien. It, therefore, owes Cellcom the attorneys' fees it
has expended to contest the liens, and substantial damages.

POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING SYSCOM
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS INCURRED ON APPEAL.
The trial court awarded Syscom attorney fees and costs incurred on appeal in the amount
of $22,744.76, attempting to justify its award with the barren statement that Syscom was the
"most prevailing party" on appeal. (F's and C's, f 26). The court's award is flawed in two
respects.
First, Syscom was not the "prevailing party" on appeal. This Court reversed the trial
court's judgment in Syscom's favor in Cellcom I and remanded the case to the trial court "on the
issue of whether Syscom can recover" from Cellcom. American Rural Cellular. 890 P.2d at
1042. The trial court erred in determining that this Court's reversal of its judgment in Syscom's
favor somehow meant that Syscom was victorious on appeal. It is impossible to tell exactly why
the trial court felt that Syscom had "prevailed" on appeal because there are no subsidiary facts
supporting the trial court's determination that Syscom was the "most prevailing party."
Second, there is no indication in the record that the amount of attorney fees and costs
entered was reasonable. While Syscom's counsel submitted an affidavit stating only that he had
incurred $22,744.76 in attorney fees and costs, the affidvait utterly failed to comply with Utah
Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-505, which requires "legal basis for the award, the nature
of the work performed by the attorney, the number of hours spent to prosecute the claim to
judgment, . . . and affirm the reasonableness of the fees for comparable legal services." The trial
court's perfunctory rubber-stamping of the exact amount requested by Syscom, without requiring
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compliance with Rule 4-505, constituted error. The award of attorney fees and costs incurred on
appeal and thereafter should be reversed.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING
CELLCOM'S RULE 59 REQUEST THAT IT RECEIVE NEWLY
DISCOVERED EVIDENCE OR ORDER A NEW TRIAL.
After this Court vacated the trial court's judgment and remanded for new findings,
Cellcom moved for a new trial or to reopen to consider this newly discovered evidence pursuant
lo Rule 59, but the trial court denied the request. The court abused its discretion in denying the
Rule 59 motion because the evidence was newly discovered, material evidence that should have
changed the outcome of the case, had it been received.
Only after the trial ended and Cellcom initiated appeal could Cellcom fully account for the
hundreds of thousands of dollars that Syscorn expended. Prior to this it could not fully account
because Syscom failed and refused to turn over all bank statements and other records requested
during discovery. After the trial (which Cellcom moved to postpone in order to do an accounting)
Cellcom obtained bank statements, vendor accounts and other financial information necessary to
do an accounting. The accounting showed that Syscom paid itself $107,638.54 for a few months'
work, even though the Management Agreement limited its monthly draw to $10,000.00 per month
as a management fee. It further showed that System spent $189,093.26 of Cellcom's money on
"equipment," although Motorola actually directly supplied the telecommunication equipment.
Finally, it revealed that Syscom spent over $7,000.00 of Cellcom's money on office expenses and
nearly $12,000 of Cellcom's money on telephone expenses, even though Syscom agreed in the
Management Agreement to run the office and use the telephone line "at its own expense."
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Cellcom learned in late 1993, after appeal commenced, that employee Marie Bagshaw had
purposefully withheld information from Cellcom officers about problems with the system until
after trial. These problems included Syscorn's installation of a tower at the Asphalt Ridge and
Blue Bench sites in the wrong location, incomplete grounding of equipment racks at the Blue
Bench site, and asphalt swelling around the building Sy scorn installed at the MTSO site. Nuts,
bolts, and screws were loose at every site, and the doors to the buildings at all three sites were
improperly installed.
The above evidence was essential to Cellcom's claim that Syscom did not perform, but
instead breached the contract. Had the trial court considered on remand the abundant evidence
of Syscom's deception and ineptitude, it would have had more than sufficient evidence from which
to conclude that Syscom materially breached the contract and was liable to Cellcom for the
resulting damages. Cellcom met all the requisites for the reopening of a trial based on newly
discovered evidence. Doty v. Town of Cedar Hills. 656 P.2d 993 (Utah 1982) (newly discovered
evidence must be material and of sufficient substance to create a reasonable likelihood that the
consideration of the evidence would have yielded a different result). Nonetheless, the trial court
summarily dismissed Cellcom's Rule 59 motion, despite Cellcom's representation that reopening
the trial to consider this new evidence would require minimal time to present. £££ Gardner v.
Christensen. 622 P.2d 782, 784 (Utah 1980) (motion to reopen trial should have been granted
where presentation of proposed evidence would not have expended much time). The trial court's
refusal to hear all relevant evidence deprived Cellcom of a fair trial and constituted an abuse of
discretion.
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POINT VI
JUDGE ANDERSON SHOULD HAVE RECUSED HIMSELF.
A few months before Judge Anderson took the bench, his law firm represented Syscom
and its current president, Rodney Hauer, in a transaction closely related to this case.8 Cellcom
moved to recuse Judge Anderson on two grounds: (a) Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-1(1); and (b)
Canon 3(E) of the Utah Code of Judicial Conduct. Judge Anderson refused to recuse himself.
Judge Anderson's failure to recuse himself contravenes Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-l(l)(a),
which provides that a judge may not sit in a case "in which he is interested. . ."
Anderson's firm evaluated the merits of this very litigation, and because Judge Anderson's
potential exposure, however remote, depends on the outcome of the litigation, he is an
"interested" party within the meaning of § 78-7-l(l)(a), and recusal was required.
On the same facts, Judge Anderson should have recused himself under Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-7-l(l)(c), which provides that "except by consent of all parties, no justice, judge, or justice
court judge may sit or act in any action or proceeding . . . when he has been attorney or counsel

8

The law imputes to Judge Anderson all knowledge of his then law firm. Smith v. Whatcott. 757 F.2d 1098
(10th Cir. 1985.) Judge Anderson's law firm represented defendant Syscom and its president, Mr. Rodney Hauer,
in the purchase back of 40% of Syscom's stock from defendant Neal Sorensen. In advising Syscom on the fairness
of the transaction, Judge Anderson's firm would presumably have assessed the proposed purchase price in light of
Syscom's known liabilities and assets. Spector v. Mermelstein. 485 F.2d 474 (2d Cir. 1973); Hart v. Carro Spandock
Kaster and Cuiffo. 211 A.D.2d, 620 N.Y.S.2d 847 (1995); Fisher et al. v. Reich et al» 1995 W.L. 23966 (D.N.Y.
1995). In a company then valued by the buyer and seller at approximately $180,000 (Syscom ultimately agreed to
pay $72,000 for Mr. Sorensen's 40% ownership stake), the outstanding litigation with Cellcom, where at least
$77,415.33 in mechanic's liens, plus statutory attorney's fees, were at stake, was a significant potential asset (or
liability) that Judge Anderson's firm would have evaluated. The claims by and against Cellcom were, in fact, so
significant to the value of Syscom that they were addressed in the Stock Purchase Agreement ("Agreement") that
memorialized the transaction. (Agreement, at 1 8; R. 1212.)
After Anderson's firm's presumptive review of the pending litigation and determination of the likelihood of
success, Syscom, through Mr. Hauer, signed the Agreement with Mr. Sorensen. Judge Anderson, as a partner at the
time these services were rendered, is and remains jointly and severally liable for any potential claims ensuing from
the firm's services, including evaluation of the likely outcome of this litigation.
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for either party in the action or proceeding." Judge Anderson is charged with representation of
all clients of his firm. See Smith v. Whatcott. 757 F.2d 1098 (10th Cir. 1985).
Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(E) requires recusal when "the judge's impartiality
might reasonably be questioned." Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(E)(1).9 The court's
potential financial stake in the case and his firm's representation of defendant Syscorn and its
President, Rod Hauer, a material witness in the bench trial, constituted grounds whereby the
court's impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
Scott v. United States holds:
The appearance of partiality prescribed by Canon 3(E) can never be waived by the
litigants regardless of the immateriality of the Canon violation. Thus, the Canon
recognized that some appearances of impropriety are so compelling that given the
purposes of the Canons, they can never be waived or deemed harmless.
Scott v. United States. 559 A.2d 745, 751 (D.C. App. 1988). The federal statute that parallels
Canon 3(E) is not waivable except if, after full disclosure, the parties waive any appearance of
impropriety or conflict. Potashnick v. Port City Construction Company. 609 F.2d 1101, 1114
(5th Cir. 1980). No disclosure or waiver occurred here.

9

As Canon 3(E) is incorporated into the Federal Judicial Disqualification Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 455, federal
decisions interpreting the statute are instructive. The test for recusal under Canon 3(E) is objective. Lilieberg v.
Health Servs. Acquisition Corp.. 486 U.S. 847 (1988). A judge must recuse from any case in which there is "an
appearance of bias or prejudice sufficient to permit the average citizen reasonably to question [the] judge's
impartiality." United States v. Heldt. 668 F.2d 1238, 1271 (U.S. App. D.C. 1981), cert, denied. 456 U.S. 926
(1982) (footnote and citations omitted). The standard "is rigorous: [C]ould a significant minority of the lay
community . . . reasonably question the court's impartiality?'' Reillv v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation
Authority. 330 Pa. Super. 420, 458, 479 A.2d 973, 992 (1984). "The objective standard is required in the interest
of ensuring justice in the individual case, and maintaining public confidence in the integrity of the judicial process
which 'depends on a belief and the impersonality of judicial decision making.'" Scott v. United States. 559 A.2d 745,
749 (D.C. App. 1988) (citations and footnote omitted). Neither bias in fact or actual impropriety is required to violate
the Canon. Hall v. Small Business Admin.. 695 F.2d 175, 178-179 (5th Cir. 1983).
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Recusal was mandated since, as Judge Anderson apparently recognized, a fully-informed
person might reasonably question whether the judge "could decide the case with aloofness and
disinterest." Pepsico. Inc. v. McMillan. 764 F.2d 458 (7th Cir. 1985). After all, just a few
months after his leaving private practice where his sole partner represented the opposing party,
he made a series of discretionary rulings and decisions all of which were against Cellcom. The
court initially denied Cellcom's motion to continue the trial dates so that it could reasonably
prepare. Significantly, he was the trier of fact, judging the veracity of two witnesses representing
Syscom, his firm's client: Neal Sorensen, the former president, and Rodney Hauer, current
president. He entered judgment for every cent Syscom prayed for. He dismissed the Syscom's
breach of a contract as de minimis. He denied every post-trial motion in its entirety. See
Liljeberg. 486 U.S. at 868 n.10. Judge Anderson did all this without disclosing his firm's prior
and ongoing involvement with Syscom. (The stock buyout was amortized through 1996; R. 1206,
1212.) These circumstances present "a situation in which the judge's impartiality might well be
questioned." Potashmck, 609 F.2d at 1110.
The issue here is whether the firm's prior representation of Syscom, and its president, who
was a trial witness, might cause a reasonable person to suspect that the court might not be
impartial. This Court should require the trial judge to recuse himself. This Court should remedy
the harm arising from the trial court's failure to recuse by vacating the judgment. Liljeberg.
supra. This remedy is particularly appropriate because the trial court sat as the trier of fact.
Potashnick. 609 F.2d at 1115. Recusal should be ordered and the judgment vacated.
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CONCLUSION
The court should reverse and remand with directions to dismiss Syscom's counterclaim,
enter judgment in favor of Cellcom, and conduct a trial on Cellcom's damages. In addition, the
court should order that Judge Anderson recuse himself, and vacate the judgment.
DATED this ]$__ day of October, 1996.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

By

/dC^CXYdfrg^L
Andrew M. Morse
Julianne P. Blanch
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
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MATTING CERTIFICATE
Andrew M. Morse, attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant, certifies that he served the attached
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT AMERICAN RURAL CELLULAR, INC., upon counsel
by placing two true and correct copies thereof in an envelope addressed to:
Gayle F. McKeachnie, Esq.
Clark B. Allred, Esq.
MCKEACHNIE & ALLRED
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees
363 East Main Street
Vernal, Utah 84078
and deposited the same, sealed, with first-class postage prepaid thereon, in the United States Mail
at Salt Lake City, Utah, on the /-£"~"day of October, 1996.

AstijtL
l/0t£<——

Andrew M. Morse

ADDENDUM NO. 1
MANAGEMENT AGREEMENT (EXHffilT 75)

MANAGEMENT AGREEMENT

This Agreement made and enterea this

day of

, 1990, by

and between AMERICAN RURAL CELLULAR, INC., referred to herein as "CELLCOM",
whose business address is 261 Hannover Circle, Panama City, Florida 32404
and

SYSTEMS COMMUNICATION

CORPORATION,

referred

to herein as

"SYSCOM",

whose business address is 1275 East, 335 South, Vernal, Utah 84078.

RECITALS
A.

WHEREAS,

CELLCOM

holds

the

permit

issued

by

the

Federal

Communications Commission (the "FCC") to construct the nonwireline cellular
radio telecommunications system (the "System") that will serve the Utah-5
Rural

Service Area

("RSA"), which

is RSA

No. 677 (hereinafter

"PERMIT

AREA") consisting of Grand, Emery, Carbon, Duschene. Unitah, and Daggett
Counties, Utah; and
B.
PERMIT

WHEREAS, SYSCOM

has been in the ccmmunications business in the

AREA

for

more

than

installation

ana

servicing

nine
of

(Q)

years,

two-way

and

operation of a private paging system, and
sites

to private

pusiness

radio licensees, and

experience,

name

engaged

microwave

the leasing

thereby

familiarity

having

and

in

the

ecuipmeni,

t.^e

of communications

has acquired

business

considerable

knowledge

in

the

and

is

telecommunications industry in the PERMIT AREA; and
C.

WHEREAS,

SYSCOM

holds

an

FCC

private

radio

license

accredited by the National Association of Business and Radio Users; and
D.

WHEREAS, CELLCOM wishes to engage SYSCOM, consistent with

the

k

ules and regulations of the FCC, as an independent contractor to manage

ihe

construction,

operation,

periodic

redesign

and

maintenance

of

a

E.

WHEREAS,

CELLCOM and SYSCOM desire to enter into this contract

for the purpose of advancing their mutual financial interests by utilizing
together the PERMIT, knowledge, experience and assets of CELLCOM and the
knowledge, experience, "business and community contacts, and assets of
SYSCOM in order to engage in

the business of providing cellular radio

telecommunications services in the PERMIT AREA; and
F.

WHEREAS, SYSCOM and CELLCOM desire that SYSCOM sell cellular

telephones, accessories and peripheral equipment in the PERMIT AREA which
activity is expected to benefit CELLCOM and SYSCOM; and
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the above recitals and the mutual
agreements herein contained, CELLCOM and SYSCOM hereby agree as follows:
1.

TERM

commencing

The

term of

on

the

d3y of
2.

the

Management
day

Agreement

of

,

, 1995, s u b j e c t

1990

shall
and

be

five

(5)

terminating

to r e v i e w on an a n n u a l

years
on

the

basis.

GENERAL DUTIES OF SYSCCM

a.

SYSCCM

shall

perform

all services under

this Management

Agreement under a fiduciary relationship with CELLCOM in accordance witr.
the reasonable standards of honesty, integrity and fair
professional

manner

that

will

best

serve

interests of CELLCOM in the PERMIT AREA.
Management

Agreement shall

comply

the

dealing, and in a

financial

and

business

SYSCOM's performance under this

in all

material

respects with good

business practices in the industry, and shall be in compliance with all
applicable federal, state, and local laws, rules and regulations.
b.

Subject to CELLCOM's exclusive right of unfettered control

over business assets, facilities, operations, and policy decisions, SYSCOM
shall, as an independent contractor, manage and implement all business

activities

for

the

operation

of

the

said

business,

including

but not

necessarily limited to the following:
(i)

Operation of physical assets such as antennae, towers, cell
sites, switches, transmission lines, spare parts, terminals
and tests instruments;

(ii)

If an outside billing company is not used, collection
of
payment and receivables from
subscribers will become
SYSCOM's responsibility. SYSCOM will be reimbursed $10.00
per month, per subscriber:

(iii)

Construction, maintenance and reoair of the cellular system;

(iv)

Performance of cellular system expansion activities;

(v)

Resale of service from the wireline cellular
telecommunications system, if applicable;

(vi)

Negotiation and implementation of cost-effective
interconnection arrangements with local wireline telephone
systems, long distance carriers and other carriers;

(vii)

Provision of such assistance as CELLCOM may require in
preparing reports to the FCC or state and local regulatory
authorities;

(viii)

Conduction of price negotiations with suppliers, generation
of purchase orders, approval of payments to suppliers and
verification of receipt of materials;

(ix)

Formulation and implementation of standard operating
procedures, including programs and oolicies to assure
adherence to safety, environmental and other requirements
under applicable federal, state and local laws and
regulations;

(x)

Coordination of engineering approval of selected vendor
products;

(xi)

Negotiation and acquisition of appropriate insurance
policies;

(xii)

Coordination and negotiation with neighboring cellular
markets;

(xiii)

Selection and acquisition of office facilities and of
subscriber, system and office equipment and services;

(xiv)

Selection, training and supervision of technical, sales and
administrative personnel;

rvw^

novypinnmpnf

i m n l p m p n t a t i o n and maintenance of

(xvi)

Development, i m p l e m e n t a t i o n and maintenance of f i n a n c i a l
c o n t r o l s and p r o c e d u r e s , i n c l u d i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h
f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , t o i n s u r e e f f i c i e n t c o l l e c t i o n and
d e p o s i t , i n v e s t m e n t and disbursement of funds i n t h e name
ana on b e h a l f o f CELLCOM;

(xvi'I)

Development and maintenance of f i n a n c i a l r e c o r d k e e p i n g
procedures and maintenance of records of a l l t r a n s a c t i o n s
r e l a t i n g to the c o n s t r u c t i o n and o p e r a t i o n of the System;
and

(xviii)

Performance of a l l o t h e r f u n c t i o n s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h
purposes of t h i s Management Agreement.

c.
hereinunder

Insofar
require

as

or

the

obligations

or

the

responsibilities

p e r m i t SYSCQM to e n t e r

into

of

transactions

SYSCQM

on behalf

of CELLCOM w i t h SYSCOM, the terms and c o n d i t i o n s of such t r a n s a c t i o n s
be

on

terms

and c o n d i t i o n s

CELLCOM c o u l d
other

obtain

which

are

i n comparable

no more burdensome

transactions

entered

to

into

shall

CELLCOM
with

than

parties

t h a n SYSCOM.
3.

SPECIFIC DUTIES OF SYSCOM
For

SYSCOM

the

benefits

hereinafter

otherwise

rnntmi

and

SYSCCM

shall,

stated,

specifically

continuing

conferred

stated,

and

^nd a p p r o v a l ,

the

compensation

at

subject

its

always

diligently

own

to

be

paid

expense,

unless

Lc_J2£J-!X£tf-l-s—^Liiht

perform the

following

to

of

services

f o r CELLCOM:
aresponsible
associated

Facilities
for

services

services,

(including

equipment

hereby defined

interchange

voice

as w e l l

under CELLCOM's

and

Acquisition

the l o c a t i o n and a c q u i s i t i o n

facilities

to accommodate

Location

for

microwave

and/or
as o t h e r

PERMIT as

data

but not

services,

presently

reasonably

be
other

required

cellular

telecommunications

limited to,

l o c a l exchange and

voice

related services
it

of

shall

space on towers and

facilities)

the o p e r a t i o n

to i n c l u d e ,

of

SYSCOM

mail

services,

monitoring.

which may l a w f u l l y be

exists

or

as i t

and any

provided
associate

behalf

of CELLCOM

for additional

tower sites and associated

facilities,

including all terms and conditions of lease agreements or other agreements,
"subject always to CELLCOM's final approval of any and all agreements•
CELLCOM's

cost

SYSCOM

shall

recommend

and

arrange

for

purchase

At
and

installation of all reserve, all battery, and such generator equipment as
Is necessary and reasonable for all equipment facilities.
b.

Implementation of Business and Financial Plans

SYSCOM shall

implement a comprehensive three-year business and financial plan, provided
by CELLCOM, set forth in Attachment
generation of

A, and shall assist CELLCOM in the

required information and in all other steps for obtaining

system financing,
c.
forthwith

Sale and Installation of Customer

establish

competitive

business

and

commence

for

to

the sale,

operate

Equipment

a

rental and

SYSCOM shall

professional,

installation

ongoing,

of cellular

telephones, accessories and peripherals during the term of this Management
Agreement.

See

Attachment

E,

Sales

Agent

w:t.u«

Agreement

attached

Commission Plan for reimbursement of sign-up commission.
d.

Management and Performance of Maintenance Services

SYSCOM

shall assist CELLCOM in connection with the negotiation and implementation
of a Maintenance Contract
outine

and

operations of

emergency

to be executed by CELLCOM and SYSCOM for both

maintenance

the proposed

and

cellular

repair

service

telecommunications

required
system.

for

the

Service

provided by SYSCOM shall include, but not be limited to, the monitoring of
Jhe maintenance

performed

on

CELLCOM's

system,

analysis

and

review of

:osts. fees and charges, supervision of the actual maintenance work on the
System,

performance

omprehensive

regular

of

routine

periodic

daily
testing

checks
and

and

alignment

inspections,
of

the

and

System

first

class

cellular

intervals, SYSCOM

system

operation

and

service.

At

three month

shall submit to CELLCOM a statement, patterned after

Attachment B, attesting to the adequacy of such maintenance.
e.
by

CELLCOM,

cooperation
operations
Agreement,

Transition Services
SYSCOM
concerning

shall

Within a reasonable time, or as required

provide

assistance,

any transfer or

that may be necessitated by
SYSCOM

counsel, advice,

relocation of equipment

and

and/or

termination of this Management

will provide its services to CELLCOM at their then

published rates.
f. Bi-weekly Staff Meetings

SYSCOM and CELLCOM shall participate

in bi-weekly, or as frequent as otherwise necessary, staff meetings (which
may be conducted by telephone conference call) at CELLCOM's offices or as
otherwise designated,

the meetings, which are expected to have a duration

of one-half business day or less, shall be conducted in accordance with the
following general procedures:
(i)

In order to efficiently utilize time, coth CELLCOM and
SYSCOM shall, to the extent practical, limit to twc the
number of their representatives attencing these meetings;

(ii)

SYSCOM shall prepare an agenda prior to each meeting that
includes a listing of (a) all significant activities
surfacing during the preceding two weeks; (b) all unresolved
matters addressed during previous bi-weekly meetings; (c)
all issues
that may reasonably
be expected to be of
interest
to CELLCOM; and (d) any other items deemed to be of
sufficient interest to warrant attention at bi-weekly staff
meetings.

Ciii)

At each meeting an Action Item Listing shall be updated by
SYSCOM, in order to provide current information regarding
tasks assigned, progress made against previously assigned
due dates, personnel responsible for various tasks, and
tasks warranting further effort or direction. This Action
Items List shall be formatted after Attachment C.

complete list of all customers of
after Attachment 0.
sole

property

of

the cellular system in a form patterned

Both parties agree the customer lists shall be the

CELLCOM

and

upon

the

termination

Agreement, it shall have the sole and exclusive right

of

this

Management

to possession and

control of said customer lists, as well as all other listings and records
of

the

system's

customers,

including

any

copies

in

whatever

form and

whereever the same may be located.
h.

Insurance

SYSCOM shall require and maintain comprehensive

casualty and liability insurance for all activities and equipment which are
the subject of this Management Agreement,
insured

and

SYSCOM

as an

additional

necessary costs for such coverage.

CELLCOM shall be named as an

insured.

CELLCOM

shall

pay all

Insurance policies shall be consistent

with those set forth on Attachment E, or in a form acceptable to CELLCOM.
SYSCOM shall assure that CELLCOM
policies within

is provided with copies of all current

ten (10) days of their effectiveness.

shall not be less than $5,000,000 value.

Liability

limits

CELLCOM's name shall be placed zr.

the policy as a loss payee as its interest may appear.
i.

State and Local Approvals

SYSCOM shall timely and in writing

advise CELLCOM of all necessary state and local authority required for the
construction^

continuing

operation,

or

additional

construction

of

the

System, and take all necessary actions to obtain such authority.
J.
and

Interconnection & Tariffs

necessary

actions

required

to

SYSCOM shall take all reasonable
obtain

and

maintain

system

interconnection and tariffs with the landline exchange carriers in the most
prompt manner

possible.

As appropriate, SYSCOM

shall advise CELLCOM of

desired charges or advances in existing arrangements.

k.

Construction Supervision

of the cellular radio and microwave

SYSCOM shall supervise construction

systems, and at all times keep CELLCOM

apprised of the status of such activities.
1.

Access to Pertinent Business Records

SYSCOM shall provide

CELLCOM with access, upon reasonable notice and at reasonable times, to the
books and records maintained by SYSCOM with respect to the System,

SYSCOM

recognizes CELLCOM's need to have the right to conduct full and complete
audits without
acquired

limitations, all at CELLCOM's expense.

during

the

course

of

such

audits

shall

Any information
be

protected

as

confidential information under Section 8 of this Management Agreement.
4.

RESOURCES TO BE DEVOTED TO THE SYSTEM
In order to fulfill the obligations set forth in paragraphs 2 and

3 above, SYSCOM shall devote, at a minimum, the following resources to the
system:
a.

SYSCOM shall devote the time, as necessary, of its Partners,

Neal Sorensen or Rod Hauer, to the design and construction of the System
until the License is issued and their time as necessary to the management
of maintenance, operation and additional construction of the system, which
time shall

be

Management

reasonably

Agreement

and

split
as

among

the duties

otherwise

necessary

set
to

forth

in this

accomplish

the

objectives of this Management Agreement.
b.

SYSCOM shall, at its own expense, provide a telephone line

*ith a unique telephone number listed in the local telephone listings as
the telephone number of the Cellular Business.

(CELLCOM will designate the

lame of the cellular business which shall appear in the local telephone
Listing.)

Such telephone line shall ring into SYSCOM's current system at

Its current

business

location.

SYSCOM's

employees

shall

answer

the

by CELLCOM.
business

shall,

SYSCOM

telephone

at its own expense, add additional

lines

if

SYSCOM's

current

telephone

cellular

system

is

not

sufficient to handle the volume of CELLCOM's telephone calls.
c.
personnel

SYSCOM shall utilize its current business customer service

or

hire more quality

personnel

to answer

CELLCOM's

telephone

calls, and to service potential subscribers and subscribers* inquiries and
complaints.

SYSCOM shall provide a twenty-four

access phone number for

customers and Roamer Activations.
5.

RESPONSIBILITIES
SYSCOM's

OF CELLCOM

responsibility for overall

system

management shall be

only limited by the enumerated responsibilities of CELLCOM in this Section
5.

CELLCOM

shall

undertake

and

diligently

perform

the

following

in

connection with this Management Agreement.
a.

Site Selection and Acquisition

CELLCOM

shall assist SYSCOM

in the location and acquisition, including negotiation and contracting, of
space

on

towers

to

locate

equipment

for

the

rendering

of

cellular

telecommunications services in the Permit Area, including but not limited
to, preparing

and executing

all concracts

and

leases and other

related

documents, and purchasing and installing all equipment required by CELLCOM.
b.

Contract

Execution

CELLCOM shall execute such contracts as

are recommended by SYSCOM and which are thereafter approved by CELLCOM for
the

construction,

maintenance

and

lawful

operation

of

the

cellular

telecommunications system in the Permit Area.
c.
F

Payments

or telecommunications

CELLCOM shall make lease payments and debt payments
equipment

necessary for

the providing of cellular

service in the Permit Area except for charges or costs to be paid by SYSCOM
pursuant to Sections 2, 3, 4 and 6 hereunder.

d.

negotiate

Maintenance

and

connection

with

execute

CELLCCM shall,

all

contracts

the system.

CELLCOM

with

for

assistance

maintenance

shall

pay for

from

and

all

SYSCOM,

repairs

necessary

in
and

required maintenance and repairs on the cellular telecommunications system
during the operation thereof, save and except for the services rendered by
SYSCOM in the supervision and performance of system maintenance and repair
as

required

by

other

provisions

of

this

Management

Agreement

and

the

Maintenance Contract.
e.

Technical Training

CELLCOM shall pay all costs of technical

training to be organized, implemented and arranged by SYSCOM pertinent to
the MTSO

(Mobile Telephone Switching Office) and associated cellular site

equipment;

however, SYSCOM

personnel and material

shall

utilize,

if

feasible,

furnished by cellular system

sales

training,

equipment suppliers.

All training hereunder shall be approved in writing by CELLCOM and shall be
held in Utah, unless otherwise agreed to by both parties to this Management
Agreement.
f.

Access to Cellular System

CELLCOM shall provice SYSCOM ten

10) numbers for SYSCCM's u^e in—the—pcr^Lcrnance of
:his Management Agreement,.
;eri {10)

numbers

except

_LJLS

ob-14-gartions,

UIICJ'BTS

SYSCOM shall pay all costs associated with such

local

air time

and

local

access

charges.

SYSCOM

;halJL not sell, lease or otherwise~~derive any revenue from the use of said
en (10) numbers.
9-

System Equipment Acquisition or Lease

CELLCOM shall acquire

y purchase or lease the equipment necessary to implement operations of the
onwireline cellular telecommunications system in the PERMIT AREA and such
quipment shall be made available to SYSCOM for its use in the performance
f

its

obligations

under

this

Management

Agreement

and

subsequent

6,

COMPENSATION
a.

As compensation for full and proper compliance with the terms

of this Management Agreement, SYSCOM shall be entitled to the following:
(1)

A Service

Fee

to be paid via

monthly

payments of

$10,000-00 payable on the 15th day of each month during the term of this
Management Agreement.
(2)

Ten (10) percent of revenues from

the system, after

deduction of all federal, state and local taxes due and owing, which sum
shall be paid on the 15th day of each month, and cover the entire prior
calendar month,
(3)

In the event that CELLCOM enters into an agreement to

sell the Utah 5 cellular system or any part thereof, CELLCOM agrees to pay
to SYSCOM

5

(five) percent of

following procedure.

the sales price

in

accordance with

the

If CELLCOM receives the full sales price in cash at

closing, SYSCOM shall be paid 5 (five) percent of that amount 15 days after
closing.

If CELLCOM

receives

less than the full sales price in cash at

closing, SYSCOM shall be paid 5 (five) percent of the cash amount paid to
CELLCOM at closing within 15 days of that initial payment.
CELLCOM

Thereafter as

receives subsequent cash installments of the sales price, SYSCOM

shall receive its 5 (five) percent share of those payments, within 15 days
of

receipt

thereof by CELLCOM.

In the event that CELLCOM enters into a

sale in which cash will not be received from the buyer
cellular

interest)

.Installments,

either

then SYSCOM

at
shall

the

initial

closing

(i.e. a trade of
or

receive 5 (five) percent

in

subsequent

of the market

value (as defined in Section 24) of the consideration received by CELLCOM,
within 15 days of the closing of that transaction.
(4)
~_TI..«*—

__ _^__

•_

"*'..-•

Section a(l) and a(2) above shall be adjusted as the
_ _*__,_

._

,__ _•

__w

^^

4.--n~t^ r-<a*~or-H h^^ been

e s t a b l i s h e d to a c c u r a t e l y determine

reasonable compensation.

SYSCOM both agree to an adjustment i n compensation, i f

CELLCOM and

necessary, a t

three

month i n t e r v a l s i n 1990, 1991 and 1992.
(5)

Each p a r t y s h a l l reimburse

the o t h e r f o r

expenses by such p a r t y which a r e the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ,
Agreement, o f

days f o l l o w i n g

r e c e i p t of such i n v o i c e s as s u p p o r t e d by p r o o f of payment.

SYSCOM and CELLCOM recognize t h a t

communications
business

business

that

is

as p r e s e n t l y p e r m i t t e d

i n d t h e S t a t e of U t a h .
the

Such reimbursement s h a l l occur w i t h i n t e n (10)

COMPETITION
a.

in

applicable

Agreement,

CELLCOM

statutes

not

in direct

under

SYSCOM i s now o p e r a t i n g a
competition

the a p p l i c a b l e

and r u l e s ,

and f u t u r e

expansion and f u t u r e

after

the

date

business o p p o r t u n i t i e s

>r amendments t o the p r e s e n t r u l e s and s t a t u t e s of
and due

ome t o be i n c o m p e t i t i o n .
utside

of

this

s t a t u t e s of

of

to the f o r e g o i n g ,

this

the FCC

Management

of c o m p e t i t i o n
and CELLCOM's

business o p p o r t u n i t i e s made a v a i l a b l e

I n such event

w i t h CELLCOM's

and SYSCOM r e c o g n i z e t h a t due to a change

t h e r e may i n the f u t u r e be a p o s s i b i l i t y

:YSC0M*s p r e s e n t

Jtah-

under t h i s Management

t h e o t h e r p a r t y , and which expenses have been i n c u r r e d a t the

request of the other party.

7.

out-of-pocket

between
present,

by such changes

the FCC and the S t a t e of

the p a r t i e s

hereunder may

Should t h i s t r a n s p i r e CELLCOM and SYSCOM s h a l l ,

Management Agreement,

make e v e r y

effort

to

negotiate

in

ood f a i t h and consummate a s e p a r a t e agreement between them to cover such a
ompetitive

situation.

i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y ,
D the d u t i e s ,

The

negotiations

of

such

agreement

shall

not,

i n t e r f e r e w i t h , suspend, o r c o r r e l a t e i n any manner

r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s or c o n t r a c t u a l o b l i g a t i o n s o f each p a r t y

le o t h e r as s e t f o r t h i n t h i s Management Agreement.

to

8.

CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION; INCLUDING THIS MANAGEMENT AGREEMENT
Both parties recognize that in performing in accordance with this

Management Agreement

it will be necessary for each to become conversant

with certain information, regarding • the business of the other that is not
generally

available or

competitors,
Identity

including

known
but

to the public, or to potential
not

limited

to,

information

or actual

regarding

the

and individual needs of customers and prospective customers of

CELLCOM and SYSCOM, trade secrets, confidential marketing

techniques and

certain other confidential information concerning the business affairs of
both parties.

Each party expressly recognizes and agrees that it would be

unfair and irreparably damaging

to the other were it to disclose and/or

make use of such confidential information.

Each party covenants and agrees

that cJuring the term of this Management Agreement, and for a period of one
(1) year
will

thereafter, whether

refrain

termination is voluntary or involuntary, it

from disclosing and/or making use of any such confidential

information except as may be necessary
hereunder

or

except

for disclosures

in the performance of obligations

to counsel.

The covenant:

: r. ;r:r

section are in addition to •:•:./ other restriction on the di s: zr.L n:-.ti ::••-. :•
confidential
which

may

information, including

be

recognized

under

this Management Agreement

any

applicable

law.

generally,

Accordingly,

the

allegations set forth in this paragraph shall survive for one (1) year the
termination of

the Management Agreement regardless of the basis for such

termination.
9.

GOVERNING LAW
This Management Agreement shall be interpreted according to the

substantive laws of the State of Utah.

SYSCOM and CELLCOM hereby agree to

'subject themselves to in personam jurisdiction in Utah.

Any proceeding,

arbitration, or otherwise, brought to enforce or otherwise interpret this
Management Agreement shall be instituted in the State of Utah.
10.

TERMINATION
a.

Termination by SYSCOM

SYSCOM may terminate this Agreement

under the following conditions:
(i)

upon 10 days written notice to CELLCOM, if CELLCOM fails or
refuses to pay any amount due and owing to SYSCOM under
Section 6 hereof when due;

(ii)

(iii)
b.

immediately following the making by CELLCOM of any general
assignment for the benefit of creditors, commencement by
CELLCOM of any case, proceeding, or other action seeking
reorganization, arrangement, adjustment or composition of
CELLCOM's debts under any law relating to bankruptcy,
insolvency, or reorganization, or relief of debtors, or
seeking appointment of a receiver, trustee, custodian, or
other similar official for CELLCOM or for all or any
substantial part of CELLCOM's property; or the commencement
of any case, proceeding or other action against CELLCOM
seeking to have any order for relief entered against CELLCOM
or CELLCOM's debts under any law relating to bankruptcy,
insolvency, reorganization, or relief of debtors, or seeking
appointment of a receiver, trustee, custodian, or other
similar officials for CELLCOM or for all or any substantial
part of the property of CELLCOM, and (A) CELLCOM shall, by
any act or omission, indicate CELLCOM's consent to, approval
of, or acquiescence in such case, proceeding, or action, or
(B) such case, proceeding, or action results in the entry of
an order for relief which is not fully stayed within seven
(7) business days after the entry thereof, or (c) such case,
proceeding, or action remains undismissed for a period of
fifteen (15) days or more or is dismissed or suspended only
pursuant to Section 305 of the Untied States Bankruptcy Code
or any corresponding provision of any future United States
bankruptcy law; or
upon 30 days written notice at SYSCOM's sole discretion,
Termination

lanagement Agreement upon

by

CELLCOM

CELLCOM

10 days written notice

may

terminate

this

to SYSCOM, under the

ollowing circumstances:
(i)

the failure or refusal of SYSCOM
part of its duties hereunder and
failure or refusal for more than
notice from CELLCOM (unless such

to perform any material
the continuance of such
30 days following written
failure or refusal is

(ii)

the willful misconduct, dishonesty, gross negligence or
gross misconduct of SYSCOM;

(iii)

with 30 days written notice at CELLCOM's sole discretion; or

(iv)

11.

the making by SYSCOM of any general assignment for the
benefit of creditors, the commencement by SYSCOM of any
case, proceeding, or other action seeking reorganization,
arrangement, adjustment or composition of SYSCOM's debts
under any law relating to bankruptcy, insolvency, or
reorganization, or relief of debtors, or seeking appointment
of a receiver, trustee, custodian, or the similar official
for SYSCOM or for all or any substantial part of SYSC0Mfs
property; or the commencement of any case, proceeding, or
other action against SYSCOM seeking to have any order for
relief entered against SYSCOM as debtor, or seeking
reorganization, arrangement, adjustment, or composition of
SYSCOM or SYSCOM*s debts under any law relating to
bankruptcy, insolvency, reorganization, or relief of
debtors, or seeking appointment of a receiver, trustee,
custodian, or other similar official for SYSCOM or for all
or any substantial part of the property of SYSCOM, and (A)
SYSCOM shall, by any act or omission, indicate SYSCOM's
consent to, approval of, or acquiescence in such case,
proceeding, or action, or (8) such case, proceeding, or
action results in the entry of an order for relief which is
not fully stayed within seven (7) business days after the
entry thereof, or (C) such case, proceeding, or action
remains undismissed for a period of fifteen (15) days or
more or is dismissed or suspended only pursuant to Section
305 of the United States Bankruptcy Code or any
corresponding provision of any future United States
bankruptcy law.

REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES OF CELLCOM
CELLCOM hereby represents and warrants to SYSCOM as follows:
a. Organization and Standing CELLCOM will be a corporation

organized

under

the laws of

the

State of

Delaware and will be duly

qualified to do business in the State of Utah.
b.

Power and Authority

CELLCOM has full power and authority to

ponstruct and operate the nonwireline cellular radio system in the PERMIT
AREA and to perform the terms of this Management Agreement.
c.

Binding Agreement

This Management Agreement constitutes a

yalid and binding agreement of CELLCOM enforceable in accordance with its

d.

Oocuments

CELLCOM will deliver to SYSCOM true, correct and

complete copies of its Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws.
12.

REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES OF SYSCOM
SYSCOM
a.

hereby

represents

Organization

and

and

warrants

Standing

to CELLCOM

SYSCOM

is

as

follows:

a corporation

duly

organized and in good standing under the laws of the State of Utah.
b.
authority

Power and Authority

to execute, deliver

Agreement,

SYSCOM

and

perform

has full corporate power and
the terms of

this Management

SYSCOM has taken all necessary and appropriate corporate action

to authorize

the execution,

delivery and performance

of this Management

Agreement.
c.

Binding Agreement

This Management Agreement constitutes a

valid and binding agreement of SYSCOM enforceable in accordance with its
terms.
13.

LIMITATION ON LIABILITY; INDEMNITY
Notwithstanding

anything

to

the

contrary

in

this

Management

Agreement, SYSCOM shall not be liable to CELLCOM for any loss of damage of
any

nature

incurred

or

suffered

by

CELLCOM

in

any

way

relating

to or

arising out of the act or default of SYSCOM, or any employee of SYSCOM, in
the purported performance or nonperformance of this Management Agreement or
any

part

hereof, except

loss

or

damage

to CELLCOM

caused

by

SYSCOM's

willful act, willful default, gross negligence or gross misconduct under
this

Management

recoverable by

Agreement
virtue of

to
the

the

extent

insurance

to

which

of CELLCOM.

the
In

same

is

no event

not

shall

3YSC0M be liable for CELLCOM's loss of profits and/or other consequential
Loss or damage, whether or not occasioned or caused by the act, default or
negligence of SYSCOM, nor shall SYSCOM be in any way liable for any act,

contractor

employed

for the purpose of providing

services

to CELLCOM.

SYSCOM undertakes to use due care in the context of the available labor
force in the selection of persons, if any, hired
providing

services

responsibility
omission,

or

to CELLCOM,
liability

tortuous

of

for the purpose of

but

SYSCOM

shall

any

nature

whatsoever

or otherwise, of any person so

have

no obligation,
for any

hired.

act or

Except as

otherwise set forth above, SYSCOM shall not be liable for, and CELLCOM
shall indemnify and hold SYSCOM harmless from and against, any and all
damages, liabilities, losses, claims, actions, suits, proceedings, costs or
expenses

(including reasonable billed attorneys' fees and expenses) of

whatever kind and nature imposed on, incurred by or asserted against SYSCOM
in any way relating to or arising out of this Management Agreement or the
design,

development,

construction,

operation

or

management

of

the

nonwireline cellular radio system in the PERMIT AREA.
14.

DISPUTE RESOLUTION
All disputes in connection with this Management Agreement shall

be

settled by

means

of mandatory

binding

arbitration, specifying

the

noticing party's appointed arbitrator, designating with particularity the
Tacts supporting the demand for

arbitration and constituting the alleged

breach, the legal basis thereof and the relief
shall be personally served on the other party.

requested.

Such notice

The other party, upon

receipt of such notice of termination, serve on the initiating party a
response to the notice of arbitration and shall also appoint and designate
an arbitrator.

Within thirty (30) days after the designation of the two

(2) arbitrators above stated, the two (2) arbitrators shall meet and agree
on a third arbitrator.
shall attempt

Unless otherwise agreed, the three (3) arbitrators

to agree on a third arbitrator who has experience in the

telecommunications

industry.

All

costs of

arbitration and

reasonable

billed attorney's fees shall be paid by the nonprevailing party.
IS,

CONTROL AND AUTHORITY
a.

Nothing contained

in this Management Agreement shall be

deemed to constitute a surrender or transfer of control by CELLCOM of the
right to operate the Utah 5 Cellular System.

Notwithstanding anything to

the contrary in this Management Agreement, CELLCOM shall have the sole and
exclusive right to set rates or the cellular service to be provided and to
exercise final authority over all decisions concerning the construction,
operation and maintenance of the cellular system in the PERMIT AREA.
b.

No persons working in furtherance of the performance of

SYSCOM's duties hereunder shall be the employees of CELLCOM.
persons

shall

be

SYSCOM's

employees,

All such

representatives, .consultants or

agents.
16.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE AS AN ADDITIONAL AND/OR ALTERNATIVE REMEDY
In addition to any other remedies available in law or equity to

the parties in arbitration, the parties may have the right to enforce the
decision of

the

arbitration panel

or

any

other

decision of competent

authority through specific performance as an alternative and/or additional
remedy, both parties recognizing

that

the unique services contemplated

pursuant to this Management Agreement demand the availability of such
remedy.
17.

NOTICES
All notices, demands, requests, offers or responses permitted or

-equired hereunder shall be deemed sufficient if mailed by registered or
:ertified

mail

or

by

reputable

>repaid. addressed as follows:

overnight

delivery

services,

postage

To SYSCOM:
Neal M. Sorensen
President
Systems Communication Corporation
P. 0. Box 1818
Vernal, Utah 84078
And to:
SYSCOM's designated counsel:
Michael F. Morrone, Esquire
Keller and Heckman
1150 17th Street, N.W.
Suite 1000
Washington, D.C. 20036

&

cfv*t

-Q

To CELLCOM:
Dennis L. O'Neill
President
261 Hannover C i r c l e
Panama C i t y , F l o r i d a 32404
And t o :
CELLCOM's designated counsel:
James Ireland, Esquire
Cole, Raywid & 8raverman
1919 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W,
Washington, D.C. 20006

18-

SEVERABILITY
The invalidity or unenforceability of any particular provision of

this Management Agreement shall not affect the other provisions hereof and
Ishall be construed

in all respects as if such invalid

or

unenforceable

provision were omitted, however, both parties shall use their best efforts
to modify the offending provision to conform to the rules and regulations
while preserving

the essential

benefits of

this Management Agreement

to

19.

NO WAIVER OF DEFAULT
A

failure

by either

party

to

take

action on

account

of any

default by the other party shall not constitute a waiver of any rights set
forth

in

this Management Agreement

as they

relate to future performance

under this Management Agreement.
20.

SUCCESSORS
This Management Agreement shall be binding on and shall operate

for

the

benefit

designees,

assignees

representatives.
without

of

all
and

parties

hereto

successors

and

in

their

interest,

respective

heirs,

including

legal

However, this Management Agreement shall not be assigned

the written consent

of

the Parties.

Such consent

shall not be

unreasonably withheld.
21.

HEADINGS
Paragraph headings are provided for convenience only and are not

a part of this Management Agreement.
22.

ASSIGNABILITY
CELLCOM may assign its rights and obligations under this

Agreement by giving SYSCOM written notice of such assignment.

Upon thirty

(30) days' written notice to SYSCOM, CELLCOM may assign all of its rights,
duties and obligations under this Agreement to an affiliate or subsidiary
of CELLCOM, or any other entity in which CELLCOM has a contolling interest.
3ny other assignment may be made only with the prior written consent of the
Dther party, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld.
23-

INTEGRATION
This Management Agreement contains all other agreements, whether

iritten or oral, except for the lease referenced in Section 3a, the Sales
igent Agreement and the Maintenance Agreement.

This Management Agreement

24.

MARKET VALUE
At any time when it shall be necessary to determine the fair

market

value

of

the System,

the—Buyer -and

agreement- determine the fair market value.

the Seller may

by

written

If the Buyer and the Seller

are unwilling or unable to make such a determination within 5 business days
after either party receives notice of the occurrence of any event requiring
the determination

of

fair market value,

then

the Bi*ye*=- and

the Seller

shall, within the 10 business days after the expiration of such 5 business
day

period,

business
third

each select

an

appraiser

days after being approved,

appraiser.

satisfactory

to it and

within

3

the two appraisers shall appoint a

Within 3 business

days after

the third

appraiser is

selected, the Buyer and the Seller shall each advise the other in writing
whether
fails

the three appraisers are satisfactory

to

advise

the

other within

to them.

such 3 business day

If either party
period

that

the

appraisers are satisfactory, then the parties shall negotiate in good faith
to agree

on

three mutually

acceptable appraisers within 5 business days

after expiration of such 3 day period.
Each

appraiser

shall

have

cellular telephone systems.

at

least

3

years

experience

appraising

In arriving at the fair market value of the

System, the appraisers shall use data collected from the sales of interests
in

cellular

telephone

systems

in other United

States

markets having a

population of comparable size to the market served by the System and which
have

occurred

within

the

two year

period.

The System

shall

take

into

account relevant differences affecting value between the markets served by
such systems and the market served by the System, and such factors as the
amount of debt assumed by the purchaser of any such system, the amount of
^he

System's

cash

on

hand,

its

account

receivable

and

payable,

and

for

market

cellular

telephone

fair-market value of
appraisal

and

then

serving

rural

service

the System shall be determined

that deviates

appraisal's,

systems

to the greatest

averaging

the

two

extent

The

by disregarding the

from

remaining

areas.

the two

remaining

appraisals.

deviation among all three appraisals is the same amount,

If

the

then all three

appraisals shall be averaged, as the case may be, shall constitute the fair
market value of the System and shall be final and binding on the parties.
25.

COMPLIANCE WITH FCC RULES
Notwithstanding

anything

in

this

Management

Agreement

to

the

contrary, both Parties agree that if any provision shall be deemed to be
inconsistent with or in violation of the FCC's rules, such provision shall
be null and void.
modify

the

preserving

In such event, both Parties agree to use best efforts to

offending
the

provision

to

conform

essential benefits of

to

the

this Management

FCC's

rules

Agreement

while

to each

party.
26.

RELATED PARTIES
Either

related

party

party
or

may

affiliate

enter
for

into

any

reasonable

the

performance

of

agreement

with a

services

of

the

acquisition of equipment or other property; however, each such agreement
shall be on terms no less favorable to the other party than could readily
be obtained if it were made with a person who is not the related person or
affiliate or partner of the other party.

CELLULAR COMMUNICATIONS OF
EASTERN UTAH. INC.

8y:
Dennis L. O^Neill
President

SYSTEMS COMMUNICATION
CORPORATION

By:.
Neal M. Sorensen
President

ADDENDUM NO. 2
SEPTEMBER 18, 1995 RULING; FINDINGS
OF FACT & CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
VERNAL DEPARTMENT

AMERICAN RURAL CELLULAR, INC. :

' TAH
' 9 70<?5
«V^*A* ^ ^
$£p
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RULING

a Delaware Corporation
Plaintiff,
vs.

SYSTEMS COMMUNICATION
CORPORATION, a Utah Corporation,
and NEAL M. SORSENSEN, an
Individual,

Case No. 910800064 CN

Defendants.
The above-captioned matter came regularly before the Court for Trial October 15th &
16th, 1992. After hearing evidence and arguments of counsel, the Court made and entered its
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and entered a Judgment on Defendant's
Counterclaim for $116,040.96. The Plaintiff appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals. The
Appellate Court analyzed the case and remanded for express findings;
1. The Trial Court was directed to make express findings on the crucial threshold
issue of whether SYSCOM was a contractor under the Building Trades Act.
2. The Court of Appeals also made direction for a factual finding of which charges
would be lienable and which charges would be payable under the management agreement in
the event the Court determined Syscom was acting as a contractor, did not fit any of the
exceptions to the licensing statute and accordingly there were direction to make findings
regarding the allocation of attorneys fees.
This Court has carefully reviewed the transcript and the Court's own notes concerning
the evidence adduced at trial and now makes and enters the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Syscorn was not a contractor under the Licensing Statute. The record in this case
clearly forms a basis for the Court's finding that Syscom was a participant in the permit
company and not a contractor. In some instances, particularly relating to the actual physical
construction, Syscom acted as an agent of the Plaintiff. References in the record are to the
record of proceedings on appeal. The Defendant, Syscom, arranged the financing (found
Motorola) pages 764 and 765. Defendant completed the interface with US West
Communications, pages 775 and 776. Defendant did the electrical and telephonic systems
engineering to get the complete system up and running. Defendant did whatever was
necessary with Plaintiffs blessing assuming the complete permit company was online.
2. The Defendant, Syscom, was to share in sales and was to be involved in the
operation and maintenance after completion and operation of business. The Defendant also
constructed the buildings, obtained permits, and acted in the physical construction as an agent
of the Plaintiff.
3. Neal Sorensen testified that he was excited about being in the cellular business and
that O'Neal of American Rural Cellular sought Syscom out because they were in the radio
and telephone business. Conceptually, it is important to note that Syscom became involved
and acted with due diligence to help the Plaintiff get the company online. It would appear
from the record, that Plaintiff had the winning lottery ticket and was under guidelines to
complete the system and get it up and running within specified time frames.
4. The work of putting together the cellular telephone company progressed and
eventually, as the initial phase of setting up the cellular telephone system was nearing
completion, one version of a Management Agreement was signed by Plaintiff and another was
signed by Defendant. The parties went forward with the work as if they had agreed to the
terms embodied in the Management Agreement. (T. 244-245, 247, 280-282).
5. Under the terms of the Management Agreement, Syscom had the responsibility to,
"manage and implement the building of the system and operating it once built". Those
responsibilities included operating, servicing, and maintaining all of the towers, switches,
terminals, and other facilities, sales and billing of customers, negotiating interconnections,
arrangements with local wireline telephone systems, establishing written operating procedures,
and selecting, training, and supervising technical sales and administrative personnel and many
other duties. (T. 248-251, Ex. 1 and 75).
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6. For performing these functions, ARC agreed to pay Syscom a "service fee" of
$10,000 per month plus 10% of the revenues from the system, minus certain deductions for
taxes- The $10,000 per month management fee, although not called that by the parties, was
substantially a fee for radio and telephone engineering and management services (T. 127,
240-241, Ex. 1 and 75).
7. Although the Management Agreement states that Syscom is an independent
contractor, the agreement also states that Cellcom had the right to make all decisions and
direct how the work was done in putting together and operating the telephone company. The
parties' actions indicate their recognition that ARC was in total control and could direct, and
at times did direct, how work was to be performed and how the money was spent. (T. 133,
134). For example, communications about the details of the work took place nearly daily as
the work progressed and ARC directed Syscom to withdraw monies and send the money to
ARC in Florida, which Syscom did in a sum of $118,156.60. (T 39, 85,* 105, 115-116, 244,
254, 269-273, Ex. 1 and 75).
8. Part of the money to be received by Syscom was Ten (10%) percent of gross
revenue and in the event the cellular telephone system sold, Syscom is to receive five (5%)
percent of the sales price. (T. 128, 247, Ex. 1 and 75).
9. As Syscom went to work to put together the telephone company, Neal Sorensen
and Marie Bagshaw, the contact person Syscom had with Arc, talked on the telephone three
or four times a week, if not more often. (T. 85, 244).
10. Syscom was to be paid a fee called a service fee for its work in creating the
new telephone company, which fee was the same during the construction period and the
operation period. (T. 122), (Ex. 1 and 75).
11. Plaintiff breached its covenant of good faith dealing by ceasing to communicate
v/ith the Defendant when Defendant was attempting to finish the cell sites and operate the
system. This failure to communicate commenced several months prior to the termination of
the agreement by Plaintiff. (T. 51, 86-87, 299-301).
12. Defendant breached the agreement by advertising a competing product, however,
paragraph seven of the Management Agreement recognized that there would be some conflict
between Systems Communications1 existing radio business and the cellular business and
entered into the agreement with this knowledge and expressed reference to that potential
problem. The Court finds the breach to be minor. (T. 276-278, Ex. 1 and 75).
13. The Defendant, Systems Communication Corporation, sincerely pursued the
construction and management of the system in anticipation of and reliance on future
expectations of profit. (T. 247).
-3-

14. The Plaintiff, American Rural Cellular, Inc., received a completed and developed
system at a reasonable price and was satisfied with the product. (T. 101, 106, 143).
15. The Sales Agency Agreement signed by the parties enabled Syscorn to participate
in the sale of cellular telephones and states that it would do so as an independent contractor.
(ex. 23).
16. Plaintiff was satisfied with how the buildings and towers were constructed. (T.
106). Plaintiff and its engineers supervised SYSCOM and approved the disbursement of
funds from the various accounts. (Ex. 1 and 75).
17. The services performed by Defendant, Systems Communication Corporation,
improved the liened properties and were reasonable. The charges for work performed both
by outside contractors and employees of Systems Communication Corporation are properly
chargeable against Plaintiff, in addition to the $10,000 per month agreed upon service fee>
(T. 240-241).
18. There is owing to Systems communication by Plaintiff, the sum of $31,543.33 for
work it did and hired performed and materials supplied for improvements on the property
covered by the lien identified in the First Cause of Action. (T. 306), (Ex. 76).
19. Three is owing to System Communications by Plaintiff, the sum of $23,136.17
for work it did and hired performed and materials supplied for improvements on the property
covered by the lien identified in the Second Cause of Action. (T. 306), (Ex. 76).
20. There is owing to System Communications by Plaintiff, the sum of $16,439.33
for work it did and hired performed and materials supplied for improvements on the property
covered by the lien identified in the Third Cause of Action. (T. 306), (Ex. 76).
21. The agreements between the parties included a provision that in the event of
default that the defaulting party would pay the costs of enforcement including reasonable
attorneys fees. (T. 325), (Ex. 1, 23, and 75).
22. Defendant has been required to hire an attorney and to pursue its counterclaim in
this matter in enforcing Plaintiffs obligation to make the payments it agreed to make under
that agreement. (T. 325-327).
23. A reasonable fee to be awarded Defendant work related to the lien foreclosure is
$15,000.00.
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24. Since the Court has expressly found that SYSCOM was not acting as a
contractor, the Mechanic's Lien Statutes are not and were not relevant to this action (other
than to secure Syscom's position as a tactical matter up front),
25. Pre-Judgment interest is and should be allowable on the definite amounts
determined.
26. SYSCOM1 s attorneys fees are chargeable under the Management Agreement and
the contract under which the parties operated as the Court finds that SYSCOM was "the most
prevailing party" and is therefore entitled to attorneys fees and costs through the course of the
Appeal.
27. Based upon the record at trial, the Court expressly finds that SYSCOM's services
performed were reasonable and outside and/or inside contract employee man hours were
properly chargeable in addition to the service fees. The prior Memorandum of the Court
insofar as the Findings and Conclusions are not inconsistent herewith are incorporated and the
Court concludes, therefore, that SYSCOM is entitled to Judgment against American Rural
Cellular as follows: First Claim $31,543.33; Second Claim $23,136.17; Third Claim
$16,439.33; Commissions $2,376.92; Attorneys fees entire proceedings through the date of
Appeal $15,000; Attorneys fees and costs incurred on Appeal and Post Appeal $22,744.76;
Pre-Judgment Interest $39,913.05 for a Total Judgment in the amount of $151,153.56.
DATED this if

day of September, 1995.
BY THE

sJAAs^—
JOHN RTANDERSON, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the J
_day of September, 1995, true and correct copies
of the Ruling were mailed, postage prepaid, or hand delivered to: Mr. Andrew Morse,
Attorney for Plaintiff, at SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU, 10 Exchange Place,
#1100, Salt Lake City, UT 84111 and to Mr. Gayle F. McKeachnie, Attorney for
Defendants, at 121 West Main Street, Vernal, UT 84078.
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
or

AMERICAN RURAL CELLULAR,
INC., a Delaware Corporation,

******

Jea

RULING

Plaintiff,
vs.

SYSTEMS COMMUNICATION
CORPORATION, a Utah
corporation, and NEAL M.
SORENSEN, an individual,

Case No.: 910800064 CN

Defendants.
The Court entered its Findings in accordance with directions from the Court of
Appeals in this matter on September 18, 1995. The Court further requested counsel for the
parties to submit proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment and has
received various Motions from the Plaintiff who is unhappy about the Court's Ruling. The
Court has carefully read the Motions, the Memorandums supporting the Motions, the
Responsive Memoranda filed by the Defendant and additional Responsive Memoranda filed
by the Plaintiff. The Court is now in a position to enter its final Ruling regarding this matter
and will deal with the Motions in the order in which they were filed.
1, Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial filed September 29. 1995
The Court is of the opinion that Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 59 criteria have
not been met. There is no Affidavit supporting the basis for the Motion. The Court
recognizes Plaintiffs counsel was not trial counsel. However, Plaintiff seems to be arguing
with the Court's interpretation of conflicting evidence. Plaintiff is also arguing factual
matters which were unrefined at trial with facts they have learned through diligence
subsequent to trial.

o&ury

The Court was in a unique position to hear the evidence at the time of trial. That was
the time for the case to be heard. There is adequate evidence in the trial record to support
the Court's Findings and subsequent Findings of September 18, 1995. For example, Neal
Sorensen testified that he was excited about the cellular business (citations are to the
Appellate record, 767), and that. . . .MSyscom was to manage aW implement all business
activities for the business operation (768)."
Defendant arranged the financing (found Motorola) (764, 765 ). Defendant completed
the interface with U.S. West (775, 776). Defendant made decisions about locating and
serving the sites (762, 763). The only witness for Plaintiff, Marie Bagshaw, did not dispute
those factual assertions at the time of trial. Plaintiff sued to rescind the agreement.
Defendants anticipated future profits were to be lost if Plaintiff prevail. Plaintiffs counsel
now wants to argue facts, later discovered through information obtained from his own client
that are in dispute but not brought out at trial. The trial of this case took two days and is
over. Plaintiffs Motion to Reopen is denied. Request for Oral Argument is denied.
2. Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider Ruling Precluding Responsive Memoranda
or Oral Argument on Proposed Findings filed October 11. 1995
The Trial Court has broad discretion to control the proceedings and procedure before
it. The Court could have made specific findings as directed by the Court of Appeals without
any input from the parties. At the conclusion of the hearing determining whether there had
been a settlement, the Court outlined, with consent of the parties, the simultaneous
submission of Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The Court considered
those in its analysis and made its specific Ruling on September 18, 1995. In the Court's
analysis the specific references were made to the record, the Court is of the opinion that
there is substantial preponderant evidence in the record to support the Court's Findings both
before and after the Appeal. Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider Ruling and for Oral Argument
on Proposed Findings is denied.
3. Plaintiffs Objection to Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law filed
October 12. 1995 and Request for Oral Argument
For the reasons outlined in the Court's analysis of the first two Motions further
extensive comment is unnecessary. The Court again is of the opinion that there is ample
preponderant evidence in the record to support the Findings of Fact and additional Findings
entered by the Court on September 18, 1995 all according to the instructions of the Court of
Appeals. Plaintiffs objections to the Findings are denied. Request for Oral Argument is
denied.
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4. Plaintiffs Motion to Disqualify Judge
While the Court is sensitive about the appearance of impropriety, the Court can't
condone the untimely way the Plaintiff kept this knowledge under its hat until things began to
go badly for it. Since the Plaintiff kept his hole card hidden so long, he can't now play it.
The Court is of the opinion that the Motion to Disqualify need not be supported by an
Affidavit under Rule 63 under this situation.
The Court is of the opinion, however, that the appearance of impropriety
disqualification is in fact waiveable and in situations where the Court has prior knowledge of
the appearance should make a record stating the facts known to the Court to allow the parties
to discuss the matter and waive a recusal on the record. In this situation, the Court had no
knowledge of any facts later learned regarding the law firm's handling of the Escrow
transaction. It seems apparent to the Court, however, that the Motion to Disqualify should
be made at the time counsel became aware of or learned of the facts leading to the
disqualification. I think the Madsen vs. Prudential Federal Savings and Loan Association
case is controlling.
767 B2d 538(Utah'1988).
Counsel for Plaintiff apparently had knowledge of the Beaslin and Anderson Escrow
function in July, 1995. In all good sense, Plaintiff waited to play this card until it had an
unfavorable Ruling. Plaintiffs Motion was not filed with knowledge of facts until after it
had participated in a Motion and hearing to enforce a settlement agreement, prepared and
filed its proposed Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, filed a Motion to Reconsider,
filed a Motion for a New Trial, and Motion to Reopen the Case for further Fact
Presentation. Almost 90 days had elapsed. Plaintiffs Motion to Disqualify Judge is denied.
Request for Oral Argument is denied. The Court is of the opinion this is a borderline
chicken shit Motion but because of the sensitive nature of the Motion, the Court will not
award attorney fees.
5. Plaintiffs Motion to Disqualify McKeachnie and Allred
The facts presented to the Court in the Memoranda submitted indicate no
attorney/client relationship. There does not appear to be a conflict from the disclosures that
were made and the Motion is not timely. Once again, presumably the Plaintiffs, Mr. O'Neil
and Ms. Bagshaw, knew well of the communication made with Mr. McKeachnie's office.
The Court feels that there was in fact no attorney/client relationship and therefore no
conflict. The Court is disturbed again in this situation that Plaintiffs waited until they lost to
raise the question. Motion to Disqualify McKeachnie and Alfred's Law Firm is denied.
Request for Oral Argument is denied. The Court will award $1,000 attorney fees to
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Defendants on this Motion if the time involved can be supported by Affidavit.
From the Court's Ruling herein, the Court will now make, enter, and sign the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment heretofore submitted, and they are
entered and filed herewith.
DATED this

<f#

day of November, 1995.

OHN R. ANDERSON, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the ^Ih day of November, 1995, true and correct copies of
the Ruling were mailed, postage prepaid, or hand delivered to Mr. Andrew M. Morse and
Julianne P. Blanch, Attorneys for Plaintiff, at SNOW, CHRISTENSEN, & MARTINEAU,
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor, P.O. Box 45000, Salt Lake City, UT 84145-5000 and
to Mr. Gayle F. McKeachnie, Attorney for Defendants, at 121 West Main Street, Vernal,
UT 84078.

Deputy Clerk
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discuss the legal ramifications of those facts, even
if they were true and even if they were introduced at
trial, it is indeed too late to come up with that.
Even if it was not too late to come up with it,
there's no evidence to support it.

And as Gayle

recognized, this appeal bond issue is indeed
premature.

I suggest we simply go by the rules on

approaching that issue.
Thank you, your Honor.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

I appreciate the way this matter's been
argued, counsel.

I suppose the first thing we need to

do is deal with the recusal issue.

I suppose if I

find that I should recuse, probably I'm not in a
position to rule on anything else.
I allowed oral argument and the
opportunity to give counsel full opportunity to be
heard on that issue because I am concerned as a Court
with that issue.

I'm very sensitive about that issue,

and I've indicated all along I have been somewhat
distressed by how to deal with it.
The Court has taken a good look at that.
I have looked at some ethics opinions and I've tried
to analyze it in terms of, first of all, I guess in a
gray area where there's an appearance of -- an
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appearance of -- impropriety, the Court should back
out.

The Court should always disclose that and talk

to the parties about it.

And I acknowledge that

responsibility.
I will also indicate that I have no
knowledge about any involvement.

Mr. Morse has talked

about involvement, and I guess as I read the rules
under the canons, the canons in the statute refer to
the appearance of impropriety as relating to
associations that are connected to the matters in
controversy.
As I read the Code of Judicial Conduct,
canon 3, subpart E 1(b), it clearly talks about
matters in controversy.

Subsection F of that canon

talks about where the Court has knowledge, and asks
the parties about it or makes a disclosure, and the
parties can waive it after consultation with their
clients out of earshot of a judge that seemed to
convince me that it is waivable.
I appreciate the arguments of counsel, and
in rereading the Madsen case, there are some things in
that case, I think, that apply by implication, and
some things that don't.

If you also read the Scott

case, the federal case cited by the plaintiff, there
is a situation where the judge had an ongoing
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discussion with the Department of Justice about
becoming employed with them.
Let's take a look at the actual facts of
what we have before us here.

Counsel's noted at I

guess one of the motions, one of the settlement
argument motions, an exhibit was introduced which
contained the escrow agreement.

Apparently Mr. Allred

of Mr. McKeachnie's office had drafted an escrow
agreement between SysCom and Neal Sorensen.

There was

a paragraph in that agreement which named the law firm
of Beaslin & Anderson.

Frankly, the Court looked at

the document the day it was introduced and didn't even
make the connection then.

Let's look at exactly what

it was that Beaslin & Anderson was to have done.
was the connection?

What

What was the relationship?

I suppose first we can all agree that it
was not the matter in controversy.

There was

reference in the agreement to this litigation,
allocation of who was to pay for that and how the
proceeds were to be divided between Sorensen and
SysCom if the litigation was successful.
But I think Beaslin acted in that case,
and again absolutely I had no knowledge of this, and
not even the day I read the document did a flag
raise.

What was Beaslin called on to do here?

I
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don't think he had a -- it was kind of like an
escrow.

He took the money; if the parties performed

he was to deliver the stock.
I don't know if that's the kind of
involvement that contemplates the same kind of things
that were wrong in Scott versus U.S.

Seems to me

Beaslin was acting as a fiduciary under that agreement
drafted by other attorneys to simply do what the
agreement provided, and it was no different than if it
had been placed with a title company or a bank.

I

think Beaslin had a fiduciary duty to both parties;
that the parties involved were SysCom and Sorensen.
Had nothing to do with the matter in controversy
before me.
Even at that, and I guess the Court of
Appeals is going to tell us, I'm of the opinion that
that kind, that kind of an involvement, although it
may create an appearance of impropriety, is of a nexus
that would probably, I think, be waivable where the
objection was raised so late in the proceedings.
And Mr. Morse, I appreciate the fact that
you didn't have a fast way to determine the
information.
concept.

I have suffered and dealt with this

I have previously ruled, and I apologize for

my coarse, my country judge kind of language in that
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ruling.

But it seems to me that the fact, the motion

was raised solely in these proceedings, but so much
has gone before in these proceedings that it is
waivable in this case, and that I don't think Scott
versus U.S. applies.
By the way, there's very little case law,
and I'll note for the record that the federal rules
and state rules are not identical.

The judicial

ethics rules are not the same in every state.

So I

guess this may be a case that the Court of Appeals may
have to tell me that I was wrong.
I think the language in this footnote in
the Madsen case is important, though.
is citing State versus Neeley.

Here the Court

This is footnote 5 on

page 544 of the Pacific Reporter in the Madsen case.
They tell us in close cases,
disqualification is the favored course of action.
However, disqualification is not automatic and the
basis for disqualification should be thoroughly
examined, especially in cases such as this which are
at an advanced stage of the litigation process.

And

here they were talking about an allegation of bias and
prejudice and not an appearance.
Although the language there talks about -and this is the language of the Court.

— —
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It says:
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"An
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appearance of bias or prejudice is sufficient for
disqualification; but even disqualification because of
appearance must have some basis in fact and be granted
on more than mere conjecture and speculation."
I think, counsel, that I'm going to rule
that the motion to disqualify because of the
appearance in this case, first because of the nature
of the Beaslin relationship, and second because of the
lateness of the time in which it was filed, are not
going to be grounds for me for disqualify.

And so I'm

going to indicate that I'll rule in the defendant's
favor on that.
I think the statute, 78-7-1, that's cited
also by implication talks about the prior association
or the prior law firm association, the involvement
being relating to the matter in controversy.

I think

the best course of action would be, obviously, and I
think those are -- and I think it's clear those are
automatic.

Those are just totally automatic.

And the

judge ought to know and the parties ought to know and
everybody ought to know about that up front.
Let me respond, Mr. Morse, to the rest of
the arguments and the Rule 59 motions.

I appreciate

the fact that evidence you have discovered after the
trial caused your client great distress, and you feel

onnirv
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like you haven't had your day in court.
about this, and I understand that.
stuff when we tried the case?

You're mad

Where was all this

I just have to say that

the Rule 59 motion seems to me as based, and you're
basing that on newly-discovered evidence which you
couldn't discover through reasonable diligence prior
to trial, Mr. McKeachnie has I think adequately
pointed out that there were depositions, there was
discovery. We tried the case in October, the case took
two days, and these facts simply were not developed or
presented in the record.
Your Rule 59 motion and what you've told
me here today, you take dispute with a lot of the
findings.
new issues.

You take dispute or you talk about a lot of
And I've gone back in your motion, your

written motion, and gotten the transcript and read my
notes, and I've read some of the record.

And from

what I heard at the trial, the record, I think,
clearly supports the findings that I have made.
There's direct testimony from Neal
Sorensen that he was the finder of Motorola.
he brought Motorola to this deal.
that.

He said

Nobody refuted

Ms. Bagshaw didn't refute it.

And I can only

decide these cases based on the evidence that's before
me.

if those facts were not developed at trial, they
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